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Abstract
Elected politicians work as agents on behalf of the citizens of an economy.
Once elected they are responsible for shaping the future socioeconomic path
of a country. Therefore understanding the determinants of electoral outcomes
and the incentives faced by political candidates during the election period
is key in understanding the efficacy of elections in selecting the best possi-
ble candidates. A functional electoral system should act as a quality filter
in which low quality candidates are “weeded out” and the highest quality
candidates are successful.
In reality electoral systems may not select and retain the best possible
candidates. The presence of incumbency advantage may lead to a dysfunc-
tional system with deleterious effects for welfare. Incumbent candidates may
use officeholder benefits to improve their electoral prospects. For exam-
ple, incumbents typically have access to free postage, printing and greater
fundraising capabilities than challengers and may use these officeholder ben-
efits to gain an unfair electoral advantage. As a result, the incumbent could
win the election even if the challenger is of higher quality or high quality chal-
lengers may decide not to contest the election in the first place. Incumbents
are also in a position to announce their policy choices before challengers. As
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such the incumbent may enjoy a first mover advantage which may enable the
incumbent to implement their own personal policy agenda which may not
represent the majority of voters.
The first chapter of this dissertation empirically estimates the magnitude
of the incumbency advantage in Irish elections using a regression disconti-
nuity design (RDD). Ireland provides an interesting setting for the study of
incumbency advantage as the rate of reelection of Irish politicians is one of
the highest in the world. Moreover its electoral system of proportional repre-
sentation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV) creates strong incentives
for incumbent candidates to cultivate a loyal personal following. In very
close elections, where there is a narrow margin of victory, it is likely that
bare winners are comparable in their unobservable characteristics to bare
losers. Regression discontinuity design identifies the causal effect of incum-
bency by comparing the subsequent electoral outcomes of bare winners and
losers. I find that incumbency causes an eighteen percentage point increase
in the probability that a candidate is successful in a subsequent election.
In chapter two I study open seat and incumbent-challenger elections in
a model of spatial electoral competition between two policy motivated can-
didates. The candidates differ with regard to non-policy related characteris-
tics which are desired by voters. These may include characteristics such as
charisma, charm and intelligence - collectively referred to as valence charac-
teristics. I find that incumbent candidates benefit from being first movers
and this allows them to generate favourable post-election policy outcomes.
Policy divergence between candidates is typically greater in the incumbent
challenger election compared to an open seat contest. I also show that ideo-
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logical shirking occurs once a candidate’s valence exceeds a certain threshold
as the candidate pursues her own ideology even if this is not representative
of the majority of voters.
In chapter three I examine the extent to which electoral selection based
on candidate quality alone can account for the pattern of reelection rates
in the U.S. Senate. In order to attain incumbency status a candidate has
to first win an election. Therefore it is likely that incumbent candidates
are of high quality due to political selection and get reelected with a high
probability. As such high reelection rates are not definitive evidence of a
poorly functioning electoral system. The counterfactual simulation in which
candidate quality is the sole determinant of electoral success may provide
a simple benchmark for the reelection rate in the absence of officeholder
benefits. The simulation delivers a reelection rate which is almost identical
to the observed rate prior to 1980, at around 78 percent. In the later sub-
sample, quality-based selection generates a reelection rate which is seven
percentage points lower than observed. The divergence in the reelection rates
in the later sub-sample is consistent with the findings of vote-margin studies
that indicate rising incumbency advantage due to officeholder benefits
5
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Chapter 1
Incumbency Advantage in Irish Elections: A
Regression Discontinuity Analysis
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Abstract
This paper exploits the quasi-experimental features of the system of propor-
tional representation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV) to estimate
incumbency advantage in Ireland’s lower house of parliament. It is likely that
bare winners and bare losers of very close elections are comparable in their
unobservable characteristics. Regression discontinuity design (RDD) identi-
fies the causal effect of incumbency by comparing the subsequent electoral
outcomes of bare winners and losers. The analysis indicates that incum-
bency causes an eighteen percentage point increase in the probability that a
candidate is successful in a subsequent election.
1.1 Introduction
During the period 1927-2011 incumbent members of Ireland’s Lower House
(Da´il E´ireann) were re-elected, on average, 81.7 percent of the time. This
rate of incumbent re-election is amongst the highest in the world. Matland
and Studlar (2004) compare re-election rates across twenty five countries and
find that Ireland has the fourth highest rate of incumbent re-election.1 In-
ordinately high re-election rates may give rise to concerns that incumbency
conveys an unfair advantage on incumbents versus challengers (Lee, 2008).
This may enable low quality incumbents to retain their seats by defeating
challengers of higher quality or deterring challengers from running in the first
place. Using election data from 1948-2007, I estimate the incumbency advan-
tage in Ireland’s proportional electoral system using a regression discontinuity
design (RDD). I find that incumbency causes an eighteen percentage point
increase in the probability that a candidate is successful in the next election.
Incumbency advantage may arise due to direct officeholder benefits or
indirect “scare off” effects (Cox and Katz, 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997).
Direct officeholder benefits are the extra resources and perquisites which an
incumbent has at her disposal and which may be used to improve future
electoral prospects. Such resources can include access to a staffed office,
telephones and printing but can also include local decision making pow-
ers granted to incumbents by government decentralisation (de Janvry et al.,
2012). Incumbents also enjoy greater media attention than non-incumbents
and may benefit from increased name recognition. If a potential challenger
1The three countries which ranked higher than Ireland in terms of incumbent re-election
rates were the United States (1st), Australia (2nd) and West Germany (3rd).
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knows the incumbent can take advantage of direct officeholder benefits then
he may be deterred from contesting the election. This is of particular rele-
vance for high quality challengers with a high opportunity cost of their time.
The existing literature on incumbency advantage typically focuses on plu-
rality voting, namely the first-past-the-post system in the United States. Less
is known about the incumbency advantage in proportional electoral systems.
The incumbency advantage in Ireland, while sizeable, is lower in magnitude
compared to similar studies of the US. There are several features of pro-
portional representation which may limit the incumbency advantage in com-
parison to plurality systems. For example in Ireland’s proportional system
multiple incumbents from the same party often hold seats in the same con-
stituency making it difficult for individual incumbents to claim credit for pork
barrell spending and the provision of local public goods. Furthermore, there
may be increased competition in proportional systems as candidates engage
in inter-party as well as intra-party competition. The presence of multiple
incumbents in the same constituency could also dilute media attention reduc-
ing the political visibility of incumbents and limiting the incumbent’s name
recognition advantage.
Incumbency advantage has been a contentious issue in Irish politics in
recent years in light of a high court ruling seeking to limit any unfair ad-
vantage enjoyed by incumbent politicians.2 A candidate contesting a seat in
Da´il E´ireann in 2002 was aggrieved that incumbents did not have to include
publicly funded officeholder benefits such as free post, travel and telephone
2Kelly v The Minister for the Environment and the Attorney General, 2002.
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as election expenses.3 Kelly (the applicant in the case) argued that this
gave incumbents an unfair advantage. The High Court ruled that incumbent
legislators must include the value of their office related perquisites as cam-
paign expenditure regardless of whether the perquisites were used explicitly
for campaigning. This disclosure only applies to perquisites used during the
relatively short period over which the election campaign runs (three weeks in
the 2002 election). However, as noted by Benoit and Marsh (2008), it is quite
plausible that the real campaign occurs throughout the inter-election period
by exploiting office benefits that make a continuous campaign possible.
Ireland’s proportional electoral system creates strong incentives for in-
cumbents to utilise direct officeholder benefits. Incumbents typically face
competition from within their own party and therefore need to cultivate a
loyal personal following among the local electorate to identify themselves as
separate from their parties (Marsh et al., 2008). The preoccupation with
building a local following is illustrated by Wood and Young (1997) who find
that Irish incumbents spend sixty percent of their time on local constituency
matters.
The main difficulty in empirically estimating incumbency advantage is
omitted variable bias. The multidimensional aspects of a candidate’s quality
such as charisma, charm and intelligence are typically unobservable and un-
quantifiable (Levitt, 1994). If higher quality candidates attract more votes,
electoral selection will lead to incumbents and challengers possessing differ-
ent characteristics. Failure to control for these differences may lead to biased
3In 2002, campaign expenditure for candidates was capped in Ireland. For example, in
a four seat constituency, expenditure was limited to AC31,743.
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estimates of incumbency advantage (Gelman and King, 1990). In order to
overcome the problem of omitted variable bias, I use a regression discontinu-
ity design (RDD) which focuses on very close elections which are decided by
a narrow margin of victory. The bare winners and bare losers of these close
elections are assumed to be comparable in their unobservable characteristics.
This implies that bare losers provide a valid counterfactual for bare winners
with regard to subsequent electoral outcomes. By comparing these outcomes
I identify the causal effect of incumbency.
The application of RDD to estimate incumbency advantage was pioneered
by Lee (2008), who uses RDD to estimate the causal effect of incumbency in
U.S. House elections. Lee (2008) finds that incumbency causes a 45 percent-
age point increase in the probability that a candidate contests and wins the
subsequent election. Lee’s work in applying RDD to estimate incumbency
advantage has since been emulated in several subsequent works including
Hainmueller and Kern (2008), Eggers and Hainmueller (2009), Uppal (2009
& 2010), Trounstine (2011) and Liang (2013).
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) question the validity of applying RDD to the
plurality system of the US House of Representatives due to their finding that
bare winners and bare losers from close elections may not be comparable.
House elections which are decided by the slimmest of margins tend to be
won by the existing incumbent and these outcomes are typically predicted
correctly by Congressional Quarterly’s pre-election ratings. A House incum-
bent may have very precise information about the number of votes needed
to secure victory in a close election and can make maximal use of her re-
sources to capture these votes. The ability to manipulate the variable which
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determines incumbency could lead to sorting whereby more incumbents end
up as bare winners than bare losers. This calls into question the fundamen-
tal assumption of random assignment which underpins RDD. Caughey and
Sekhon (2011) acknowledge that RDD may perform better in a multi-party
electoral system where the threshold for victory is more difficult to predict.
The PR-STV system in Ireland provides such a setting. I verify the suit-
ability of RDD to Ireland’s multi-party, multi-candidate system by applying
tests which show that bare winners and bare losers are comparable in pre-
treatment characteristics. This result supports the work of Eggers et al.
(2014) who use a dataset of 40,000 close election contests in nine countries
to show the assumptions behind the RD design are likely to be met in a wide
variety of electoral settings.4
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) also caution against over-reliance on para-
metric techniques when using the RDD methodology. The causal effect of in-
cumbency is identified using outcomes of bare winners and bare losers whose
vote share falls within a small bin width on either side of the fifty percent vote
threshold. As such, extrapolation using data far from the threshold may not
be sufficient in itself. In this paper I use both parametric and non-parametric
methods. The parametric estimation procedure is based on polynomials of
various orders, while the non-parametric method uses local linear regressions
with various bandwidths and kernels.
In addition to RDD, two other empirical strategies have been widely used
4The nine countries examined are Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, India, Brazil and Mexico. Eggers et al. (2014) attribute Caughey and
Sekhon’s (2011) finding that bare winners and bare losers in post war US House elections
are not comparable to statistical chance.
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to estimate incumbency advantage; these are the sophomore surge and re-
tirement slump (Erikson, 1971; Alford and Brady, 1988; Gelman and King,
1990; Cox and Katz, 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Jacobson, 1997, An-
solabehere and Snyder, 2002). The sophomore surge method looks at the
difference in vote shares between the first and second terms for winning chal-
lengers and the retirement slump uses the difference between vote shares of
retiring incumbents and their freshmen successors. However the popularity
of these techniques has declined in light of work by Gelman and King (1990)
and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) which show that both methodologies are
prone to sample selection bias.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses
the Irish electoral setting and the data. Section 1.3 outlines the regression
discontinuity design and shows how to estimate the RDD using both para-
metric and non-parametric methods. The results are presented in Section 1.4.
Section 1.5 provides robustness and validity tests and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Irish Electoral Setting and Data
Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with two Houses of Parliament. The
Upper House is known as Seanad E´ireann and the Lower House as Da´il
E´ireann. Members of Da´il E´ireann (referred to as Teachta Da´la or TDs)
are directly elected at least once every five years. The average length of time
between general elections for the period 1948-2007 is 3.3 years. Da´il elections
are carried out in multi-seat districts which are comprised of between 3 to 5
TDs. There are 43 districts which elect 165 TDs at each general election.
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Elections are conducted using the system of proportional representation
with a single transferable vote (PR-STV). This system allows voters to rank
candidates in order of preferences on a ballot paper. For example the voter
places a 1 beside his highest preference, a 2 beside his second highest pref-
erence and so on. A candidate is elected once she gets enough votes to meet
a predetermined quota.5 Only one of the voter’s preferences is active at any
one time (i.e. for any one vote count). For example a vote stays with the
highest preference candidate until that candidate gets elected or eliminated,
at which point it transfers to the next highest preference candidate that is
still in the running. Following a count, if no candidate has enough votes
to secure election, the least voted candidate is eliminated and his votes are
transferred. A subsequent count then takes place. The process continues
until all seats have been filled. It is extremely rare for all seats to be filled
based on first preference votes meaning that virtually all elections involve
multiple counts.
Table 1 summarizes every Irish election from 1948-2007. Fianna Fa´il has
been the dominant party in Irish politics having served in thirteen out of
the eighteen governments during this period. Fine Gael, Labour and the
Progressive Democrats have also enjoyed electoral success albeit to a lesser
extent. Prior to the 1970s, Irish politics was characterized as being very
stable with a high degree of government stagnation. Fianna Fa´il enjoyed
sixteen years of uninterrupted rule from 1957-1973 winning four elections in
a row. However from the 1970’s onwards, Irish electoral politics became more
5The following formula is used to calculate the election quota; divide the total number
of valid votes by the number of available seats plus one, ignore any fraction and add one.
For example if there are 10,000 votes and 4 seats to be filled, the quota equals 2,001.
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Table 1: Summary of Irish Elections (1948-2007)
Election Date Successful Duration of Reelection
Party/Coalition Government Rate (%)
in Days
February 1948 FG/L/CP/CT 1,211 84.1
May 1951 FF 1,084 82.3
May 1954 FG/L/CT 1,022 84.9
March 1957 FF 1,674 82.0
October 1961 FF 1,281 82.3
April 1965 FF 1,533 82.8
June 1969 FF 1,351 87.8
February 1973 FG/L 1,569 86.6
June 1977 FF 1,456 75.9
June 1981 FG/L 252 85.8
February 1982 FF 279 86.6
November 1982 FG/L 1,546 86.8
February 1987 FF 849 86.4
June 1989 FF/PD 1,259 82.7
November 1992 FF/L 1,654 81.3
June 1997 FF/PD 1,806 72.9
May 2002 FF/PD 1,788 77.3
May 2007 FF/G/PD 1,373 79.5
Abbreviations: Fianna Fa´il (FF), Fine Gael (FG), Labour (L), Progres-
sive Democrat (PD) Green Party (G), Clann na Poblachta (CP), Clann na
Talmhan (CT)
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competitive and volatile (Farrell, 1994). Of the eleven elections from 1973-
2007, only one incumbent government was fully returned to power. Declining
party attachment played a role in this increased competitiveness as did the
establishment of the Progressive Democrat party in the 1980’s.6
High reelection rates are a notable feature of Irish politics. The reelection
rate has remained above 80 percent for all but four of the eighteen elections.
The election of 1997 is notable in that its reelection rate of 72.9 percent is
the lowest in the sample. This was largely attributable to a collapse in the
Labour Party vote due to the party losing credibility after entering a coalition
with Fianna Fa´il in 1992.
I estimate the incumbency advantage using a dataset consisting of bare
winners and bare losers from constituency level elections during the period
1948-2007. In a multi-seat constituency, the bare winner is the winner of the
last available seat and the bare loser is the runner up for that seat. Note
however that one constituency election can have more than one bare winner
and/or loser. Consider the 2002 Dublin North election. After seven counts,
three candidates were left contesting the final two available seats. When
the eighth count was tallied, candidates Glennon and Wright were successful
achieving 8,640 and 8,617 votes respectively. These two candidates represent
bare winners. Candidate Daly failed to get elected achieving 7,523 votes and
therefore represents a bare loser. There are 733 constituency elections in the
dataset and 1,600 candidates.
RDD compares bare winners and bare losers from election t on their
6Sinnott (1998) reports that by the mid 1990’s party attachment in Ireland was the
lowest of the twelve EU member states.
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subsequent electoral performance at time t+1. As such I use pairs of con-
secutive elections. The dependent variable uses data from 1951-2007 and
the independent (forcing) variable uses data from 1948-2002. The dataset is
compiled using three data sources; Michael Gallaghers “Irish Elections 1948-
77: Results and Analysis”, the “Nealons Guide” publications from 1977-97
and House of the Oireachtas election data.7
1.3 Empirical Strategy
Regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a quasi-experimental design that
can be used to evaluate the causal effect of treatment when assignment to the
treatment changes discontinuously (Hahn et al., 2001; Imbens and Lemieux,
2008). This occurs when an underlying (forcing) variable passes a defined
threshold. In the case of elections, treatment is the assignment of incumbency
status and the threshold at which this occurs is a specified vote share. RDD
is based on the idea that individuals just below the threshold (bare losers)
possess comparable traits and characteristics as those just above the thresh-
old (bare winners). I identify the causal effect of incumbency by comparing
the subsequent electoral outcomes of bare winners and bare losers.
In a plurality system such as the United States the threshold is simply 50
percent of the vote share (as in Lee, 2008 and Uppal, 2010). Two candidates
compete for a seat and the candidate receiving greater than 50 percent of the
vote becomes the incumbent. However, the threshold is different in a multi-
seat PR-STV system. A candidate typically gets elected after exceeding the
7The Irish House of the Oireachtas publishes election data online at www.oireachtas.ie
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quota (discussed in Section 2). However, candidates who contest the last seat
of an election, the bare winners and losers, may fall short of the quota and
still get elected. For example, if there is one remaining seat which is contested
by two candidates after all vote transfers are made, then the highest voted of
these two candidates will be elected even if the votes fall short of the quota.
As such, I define the vote threshold at which incumbency is assigned as the
average of the votes obtained by the least voted winner and the most voted
loser in a constituency election. To illustrate the method, take the example
of the 2007 election in the constituency of Carlow-Kilkenny. Two candidates,
White and Phelan, were vying for the final seat. White, the victor, ended
up with 10,464 votes and Phelan, the loser, with 9,815 votes. Therefore, the
vote threshold at which incumbency is achieved is 10,140 (the average of the
two).
Define xi,t as the ratio of votes received by candidate i at time t to the
required vote threshold. Ii,t+1 is an indicator of incumbency status at the
next election such that,
Ii,t+1 =

1 if xi,t ≥ 1.
0 if xi,t < 1
(1)
The candidate with xi,t ≥ 1 achieves at least the minimum number of
votes required to get elected. Therefore the threshold at which incumbency
status is attained is xi,t = 1.
I now turn to a formal motivation for using RDD to estimate incumbency
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advantage. Consider the following regression,
V ictoryi,t+1 = α + β.It+1 + t+1 (2)
where V ictoryi,t+1 equals one if candidate i is elected at time t+ 1 and zero
otherwise. Ii,t+1 is a dummy variable for incumbency status which is defined
above. Unobservable quality is likely to be correlated with incumbency status
which means that E[i,t+1|Ii,t+1] 6= 0. This leads to a biased estimate of the
incumbency effect in which,
E[V ictoryi,t+1|Ii,t+1 = 1]− E[V ictoryi,t+1|Ii,t+1 = 0] = β +BIASi,t+1 (3)
where BIASi,t+1 = E[i,t+1|Ii,t+1 = 1] − E[i,t+1|Ii,t+1 = 0]. By examining
close elections RDD aims to eliminate this bias. Close elections are ones in
which the xi,t’s achieved by competing candidates occur in a close neighbour-
hood around the incumbency threshold (of xi,t = 1). By looking at data in
an interval which is close to the threshold we get,
E[V ictoryi,t+1|1 ≤ xi,t < η]− E[V ictoryi,t+1|η < xi,t < 1] = β +BIAS∗i,t+1
(4)
where η is some arbitrarily small number, and BIAS∗i,t+1 = E[i,t+1|1 ≤
xi,t < η] − E[i,t+1|η < xi,t < 1]. In the limit as η → 0, the margin of
votes separating the bare winner and bare loser becomes negligible. The as-
sumption underpinning RDD is that in these very close elections, the prede-
termined characteristics of the bare winners and bare losers are comparable.
Therefore as η → 0 the bias disappears and we are left with the true estimate
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of the incumbency effect,
lim
η→0
E[V ictoryi,t+1|1 ≤ xi,t < η]− lim
η→0
E[V ictoryi,t+1|η < xi,t < 1] = β (5)
The electoral outcomes at time t+1 are estimated separately for those to
the right of the threshold (bare winners) and those to the left of the threshold
(bare losers),
V ictoryLi,t+1 = αL + β.fL(xi,t − 1) + i,t+1 (6)
V ictoryRi,t+1 = αR + β.fR(xi,t − 1) + i,t+1 (7)
Where fR(·) and fL(·) are polynomials in the forcing variable. It is neces-
sary to model the forcing variable in this way as the conditional expectation
function E[V ictoryi,t+1|xi,t] may be non-linear. Failure to do so could result
in a non-linearity in the CEF being mistakenly identified as a discontinuity.
For convenience, I subtract the threshold value from the forcing variable in
equations (6) and (7). This ensures that the incumbency effect at the thresh-
old is equal to the intercept terms. This yields an estimate of incumbency
advantage equal to αˆR − αˆL.
An alternative to estimating two separate regressions for the winners and
losers is to estimate one single pooled regression (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
The advantage of this is that it yields direct estimates and standard errors.
The pooled regression is,
V ictoryi,t+1 = α + β.Ii,t+1 + ρ.f(xi,t − 1) + λ.Ii,t+1.f(xi,t − 1) + i,t+1 (8)
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This specification includes interactions between the polynomial terms and
the incumbency dummies. This is to capture any non-linearity which may
arise from the interaction of the incumbency dummy with xi,t.
Up to this point I have focused on a parametric estimation strategy.
The incumbency advantage can also be estimated using non-parametric tech-
niques. For ease of exposition I begin with an explanation of one of the most
basic non-parametric strategies, the rectangular kernel regression. The non-
parametric regression function is obtained by plotting local averages of the
dependent variable evaluated at each xi,t using a bandwidth h. For example,
at the point x0, the estimate, denoted Yˆ0 is,
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Yˆ0 =
N∑
i=1
V ictoryi · 1{x0 − h2 ≤ xi ≤ x0 + h2}
N∑
i=1
·1{x0 − h2 ≤ xi ≤ x0 + h2}
(9)
where N is the number of observations in the interval xi ∈ [x0 − h2 , x0 + h2 ].
As with the parametric approach, identification of the causal effect comes
from comparing bare winners with bare losers. To do this I estimate two
boundary points, one to the left and one to the right of the threshold. The
estimate to the left (right) uses data within the bandwidth h to the left
(right) of the threshold. The incumbency effect is given by,
YˆR−YˆL =
N∑
i=1
V ictoryi · 1{1 ≤ xi ≤ 1 + h}
N∑
i=1
·1{1 ≤ xi ≤ 1 + h}
−
N∑
i=1
V ictoryi · 1{1− h ≤ xi < 1}
N∑
i=1
·1{1− h ≤ xi < 1}
(10)
8I drop the time subscripts for convenience
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Figure 1: Illustration of Bias in Rectangular Kernel Regression
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However the rectangular kernel regression is not very desirable in the
RDD setting due to a bias in boundary point estimates. The bias can be
seen using a graphical illustration (as in Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Figure 1
shows a hypothetical example where the relationship between the dependent
variable (Y) and the independent variable (X) is linear. Using a bandwidth
of 0.4 I calculate the non-parametric estimates at the boundary points A
and B using equation (9). This gives the estimates A’ and B’. With upward
sloping data the estimated causal effect of interest B’-A’ is biased upwards
as seen by comparison to the true effect B-A.
This type of bias can be avoided by using local linear regressions. Instead
of simply taking averages within a bandwidth h around each data point xi,t,
I run a local linear regression of Y on X using data within the bandwidth h.
In general, for a data point x0 the following regression is run,
V ictoryi,t+1 = α + β.(xi,t − 1) + i,t+1, xi,t ∈ [x0 − h
2
, x0 +
h
2
] (11)
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The predicted value of equation (11) evaluated at x0 yields the non-parametric
estimate. As before, the causal effect of incumbency is estimated by com-
paring bare losers and bare winners. To the left of the threshold (the bare
losers) I run the following regression
V ictoryLi,t+1 = αL + βL.(xi,t − 1) + i,t+1, xi,t ∈ [(1− h), 1) (12)
and to the right of the threshold (the bare winners),
V ictoryRi,t+1 = αR + βR.(xi,t − 1) + i,t+1, xi,t ∈ [1, (1 + h)] (13)
The intercepts give the predicted values at the threshold so that the causal
effect of incumbency is given by αˆR−αˆL In the hypothetical example shown in
Figure 1, the local linear regression produces the boundary estimates A and B
thereby removing the bias associated with the rectangular kernel regression.
It is possible to combine equations (12) and (13) and estimate one pooled
regression,
V ictoryi,t+1 = α + β.It+1 + ρ.(xi,t − 1) + λ.It+1.(xi,t − 1) + i,t+1, xi,t ∈ [(1− h), (1 + h)]
(14)
The causal effect of incumbency is identified as E[V ictoryi,t+1|Ii,t+1 = 1, xi,t =
1]−E[V ictoryi,t+1|Ii,t+1 = 0, xi,t = 1].9 Applying this to equation (14) gives
β as is the estimate of incumbency advantage. Instead of using the pooled
regression we could use equation (13) to get E[V ictoryi,t+1|Ii,t+1 = 1, xi,t =
9The incumbency advantage is identified as the difference between incumbents and
non-incumbents at the threshold.
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1] = αˆR and equation (12) to get E[V ictoryi,t+1|Ii,t+1 = 0, xi,t = 1] = αˆL
giving αˆR − αˆL as the estimate of incumbency advantage. Both approaches
are identical and produce the same result. With equations (12) and (13) we
estimate the conditional expectation functions above and below the threshold
separately. The pooled regression, equation (14), estimates the exact same
conditional expectation functions in one step and therefore β = αˆR − αˆL.
The pooled regression is more convenient as it yields direct estimates and
standard errors.
Some candidates from election t may choose not to rerun in election t+1.
For example if an incumbent thinks she is likely to lose her seat then she
may strategically retire before the election. Therefore, estimating the effect
of incumbency on the probability of winning election t+1 conditional on
running in t+1 may produce estimates which are biased upwards. As such the
dependent variable V ictoryi,t+1 is a binary variable which indicates whether
a candidate runs for and wins election t+ 1.10
Studies which look at the U.S. Congress typically focus on candidate vote
share. Here I focus on a binary outcome variable which indicates victory.
This is consistent with Jacobson (1987) and Carey et al. (2000) who point
out that what matters most in elections is winning or losing, not the margin
of victory.
10For example consider an incumbent who wins by a razor thin margin at t but does not
feel confident of victory at t+ 1. He may decide to strategically retire before the election.
If I only consider the probability of winning conditional on running at t+ 1 then I ignore
the fact that this bare winner at t would likely have lost at t + 1 had he decided to run.
This would bias the estimate of incumbency advantage upwards and this is why I use the
probability of running and winning as the outcome variable.
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1.4 Results
Figure 2A plots the probability of a candidate running and winning in t+ 1
against the forcing variable xi,t. Equation (8) is estimated by regressing
V ictoryi,t+1 on an incumbency indicator, a fourth order polynomial in xi,t and
interactions between the incumbency indicator and the polynomial terms.
The solid line plots the predicted values of the probability of victory at time
t+1 and the dots are local averages of the indicator of victory at time t+1
taken over 0.02 intervals of xi,t. Figure 2A shows a clear discontinuity at
the incumbency threshold indicating that incumbency causes an eighteen
percentage point increase in the probability that a candidate runs for and
wins the subsequent election.
The magnitude of the incumbency advantage in Ireland is lower than
similar estimates for the United States. Incumbency increases a candidate’s
probability of winning a subsequent election by forty percentage points in the
US House (Lee, 2008) and thirty percentage points in US state legislatures
(Uppal, 2010) and US city council elections (Trounstine, 2011). The lower
incumbency advantage may be attributable to Ireland’s proportional electoral
system which is more competitive due to candidates facing intra-party as well
as inter-party competition. In addition, multiple incumbents in the same
district make it difficult to claim credit for pork barrel spending and may
reduce an incumbent’s name recognition advantage.
An indirect or “deterrence” effect of incumbency is often highlighted in
the literature (Cox and Katz, 1996, Levitt and Wolfram, 1997, Lee, 2008
and Uppal, 2010). Incumbents may deter challengers from rerunning in the
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Figure 2A: Probability of Running and Winning at Time t+1
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Figure 2B: Probability of Rerunning at Time t+1
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Notes: The solid lines plot the predicted values from regressing the outcome
variables at time t+1 on an incumbency indicator, a fourth order polynomial in
xi,t and interactions between the incumbency indicator and the polynomial terms.
The dots are local averages of the outcome variables at time t+1 taken over 0.02
intervals of xi,t.
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next election. Figure 2B plots the probability of a candidate rerunning at
time t + 1 against the forcing variable xi,t. In equation (8) the dependent
variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the candidate reruns in the
next election and zero otherwise. Figure 2B is consistent with a significant
indirect (deterrence) effect of incumbency. Bare winners are 16 percentage
points more likely to rerun than bare losers. As noted by Uppal (2010) this
suggests that incumbency may serve as a barrier to the reentry of challengers.
The incumbency advantage estimates are shown in Table 2. In addition
to the parametric estimates corresponding to Figures 2A and 2B, the non-
parametric estimates using local linear regressions are also shown. Both
approaches yield similar results.
Levitt and Wolfram (1997) and Gelman and King (1990) find that in-
cumbency advantage in the United States increased in the latter decades of
the twentieth century. I examine whether the incumbency effect has changed
over time in Ireland by looking at two subsamples, 1948-1969 and 1973-2007.
Apart from the fact that these subsamples each represent roughly half of
the time period covered by the data, 1969 represents an interesting point
at which to divide the data. The election following 1969 brought an end to
sixteen years of uninterrupted Fianna Fa´il rule and there followed a struc-
tural shift in the electoral strategies of Irish political parties (Marsh, 2000).
The parties realised that it was necessary to concentrate more effort into
coordinating national campaigns in order to be successful at the polls.
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Table 2: Estimates of Incumbency Advantage
Difference in Probability Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers
Parametric Non-Parametric
Specification Specification
Pr(Victory at t+1) 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.08) (0.07)
n=1600 n=970
Pr(Rerunning at t+1) 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.06) (0.05)
n=1600 n=1169
Notes: The parametric specification estimates equation (8) using a fourth
order polynomial in the forcing variable xi,t. The non-parametric specifica-
tion estimates equation (14) using optimal bandwidths which minimise the
mean squared error (as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2009). Standard errors
are in parentheses and n indicates the number of observations. *** significant
at 1%. ** significant at 5%. *significant at 10%.
Table 3 presents the estimated incumbency effects for the two time peri-
ods. From 1948-1969 incumbency causes an increase of approximately 0.20
in the probability that a candidate reruns and wins in the next election. For
the later period from 1973-2007, the magnitude of the incumbency advantage
is smaller at approximately 0.13. There is also evidence of a stronger deter-
rence effect in the earlier subsample. From 1948-1969 incumbency causes a
0.21 increase in the probability that a candidate reruns in the next election
compared to 0.13 from 1973-2007. The increased electoral competition and
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intensity of campaigning following the election of 1969 may be responsible
for the declining incumbency advantage in the later period.
Table 3: Estimates of Incumbency Advantage Over Time
Difference in Probability Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers
Parametric Non-Parametric
Specification Specification
Pr(Victoryt+1): 1948-1969 0.20* 0.23***
(0.11) (0.07)
n=625 n=406
Pr(Rerunningt+1): 1948-1969 0.21** 0.26***
(0.09) (0.10)
n=625 n=367
Pr(Victoryt+1): 1973-2007 0.13** 0.18**
(0.07) (0.08)
n=975 n=573
Pr(Rerunningt+1): 1973-2007 0.13** 0.12*
(0.07) (0.07)
n=975 n=603
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and n is the number of observations.
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. *significant at 10%.
Each of the elected governments in the sample involve either Fianna Fa´il
or Fine Gael as the main party. I estimate the incumbency advantage sepa-
rately for Fianna Fa´il and Fine Gael as well as “other” candidates (non FF
and FG). The estimates for each party relate to an incumbent’s advantage
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over a challenger from the same party. For example, the estimate of incum-
bency advantage for Fine Gael is identified using the subset of bare winners
and bare losers who are members of that party. This includes Fine Gael
candidates who won (lost) against bare losers (winners) from other parties
as well as Fine Gael candidates who won (lost) against bare losers (winners)
from the same party. The estimates are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Political Party Incumbency Advantage
Difference in Probability Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers
Parametric Non-Parametric
Specification Specification
Pr(Victoryt+1): FF Party 0.03 0.09
(0.11) (0.09)
n=707 n=476
Pr(Rerunningt+1): FF Party 0.17* 0.26***
(0.09) (0.10)
n=707 n=360
Pr(Victoryt+1): FG Party 0.24* 0.44***
(0.13) (0.13)
n=485 n=222
Pr(Rerunningt+1): FG Party 0.14 0.19*
(0.10) (0.10)
n=485 n=298
Pr(Victoryt+1): Others 0.11 0.13
(0.13) (0.14)
n=408 n=227
Pr(Rerunningt+1): Others 0.02 0.00
(0.11) (0.12)
n=408 n=244
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and n is the number of observa-
tions. *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. *significant at 10%.
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Fine Gael incumbents appear to enjoy the largest incumbency advantage
over rivals from the same party. The parametric estimation procedure indi-
cates that the probability of a bare winner from Fine Gael running for and
winning the next election is 24 percentage points higher than a bare loser
from the same party. The estimates are positive but not statistically signif-
icant for Fianna Fa´il and other parties. There is evidence of a deterrence
effect in the Fine Gael and Fianna Fa´il parties but not for others.
The higher incumbency advantage for Fine Gael could reflect the party’s
strong desire to protect incumbents once they enter office. For example
consider two Fine Gael candidates who compete closely for the last available
seat in a constituency at time t. The party may not want a repeat of this at
time t+1. They would rather see the incumbent being comfortably reelected
than doing battle with a colleague from the same party and running the risk
of neither getting elected. Therefore the high incumbency advantage could
reflect a party’s deliberate campaign strategy designed to protect incumbents.
In elections involving Fine Gael candidates competing against each other for
the last available seat, of which there are 85, only 55 percent of losers rerun
in the next election compared to 90 percent of winners.
I also divide the sample into “ruling” and “non-ruling” candidates. A
ruling candidate is part of the ruling party or coalition at election t+1. Note
that ruling is different from incumbency; a candidate may be successful in a
constituency election and get elected to Da´il E´ireann thereby becoming an
incumbent TD, however he does not have to be a member of the ruling party.
The estimates of incumbency advantage for ruling and non-ruling candidates
are shown in Table 5.
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Non-ruling incumbents are 17-22 percentage points more likely to be vic-
torious in the subsequent election compared to non-ruling challengers. The
magnitude of this effect for ruling incumbents is smaller and not statistically
significant. Incumbents from the ruling government are the group of candi-
dates which may be held most accountable for events that occur within a
country. It is possible that asymmetric voter reactions, whereby ruling party
incumbents are punished more for bad events than they are rewarded for
good events, leads to a lower incumbency advantage for ruling incumbents.
However while the magnitude of the effect is larger for non-ruling incumbents
compared to ruling incumbents, the difference is not statistically significant.
Table 5: Ruling and Non-ruling Candidates
Difference in Probability Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers
Parametric Non-Parametric
Specification Specification
Pr(Victoryt+1): Ruling 0.06 0.08
(0.08) (0.08)
n=720 n=625
Pr(Rerunningt+1): Ruling 0.14 0.18*
(0.09) (0.10)
n=720 n=408
Pr(Victoryt+1): Non-ruling 0.17** 0.22***
(0.09) (0.08)
n=880 n=560
Pr(Rerunningt+1): Non-ruling 0.13* 0.16***
(0.07) (0.05)
n=880 n=576
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and n is the number of observa-
tions. *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. *significant at 10%.
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1.5 Robustness and Validity
In Table 6 I show the main results of the paper are robust to alternative
parametric and non-parametric specifications. In the parametric specification
I estimate the incumbency advantage using a second, third and fourth order
polynomial in the forcing variable. For the non-parametric specification I
vary the size and shape of the kernel. I use a triangular and rectangular
kernel with two different bandwidths; the optimal bandwidth as in Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2009) and half the optimal bandwidth. The estimates
of incumbency advantage are similar for all specifications.
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) question the validity of applying RDD to
U.S. House Elections due to the apparent “sorting” of incumbents around
the fifty percent vote threshold. It appears that an inordinately high number
of incumbents end up as bare winners compared to bare losers. The reason
put forward to explain this sorting behaviour is that candidates in U.S. House
elections have precise information about the number of votes needed to ex-
ceed the fifty percent threshold and hence win the election. In very close races
incumbents may use their superior resources to ensure they “eke out” close
races with the result that almost three-quarters of close elections go to the in-
cumbent thereby violating the assumption that bare winners and bare losers
are comparable with respect to pre-treatment characteristics. Caughey and
Sekhon (2011) illustrate sorting using a histogram of the incumbent party’s
margin of victory which shows a significant difference between the bins to the
immediate right and left of the incumbency threshold (i.e. the bare winners
and losers). I carry out the same procedure using my dataset. In Figure 3 I
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Table 6: Robustness of Estimates to Alternative Specifications
Difference in Probability Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers
Parametric Nonparametric
2nd Order 3rd Order 4th Order Triangular Triangular Rectangular Rectangular
Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Optimal 1
2
Optimal Optimal 1
2
Optimal
Pr(Victoryt+1) 0.15*** 0.13** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.15*
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
n=1600 n=1600 n=1600 n=970 n=539 n=834 n=428
Pr(Rerunningt+1) 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.19***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
n=1600 n=1600 n=1600 n=1168 n=766 n=1012 n=603
Notes: Estimates are shown for the parametric specification using second, third and fourth order polynomials in the
forcing variable. Nonparametric estimates are shown for both triangular and rectangular kernels using two different
bandwidths; the optimal bandwidth as chosen by the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) algorithm and half the
optimal bandwidth. Standard errors are in parentheses and n is the number of observations. *** significant at 1%.
** significant at 5%. *significant at 10%.
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show a histogram of the forcing variable xi,t for incumbent candidates. There
is no significant bin-to-bin jump around the incumbency threshold of xi,t = 1
indicating that incumbent sorting does not appear to be prevalent in the case
of Irish elections. This may be due to the fact that Ireland’s multi-party,
multi-candidate electoral system with vote transfers makes the incumbency
threshold more difficult to predict.
Figure 3: Histogram of Forcing Variable for Incumbents
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
Fr
ac
tio
n
.9 .95 1 1.05 1.1
Xt
Notes: Histogram of the forcing variable xi,t for incumbent candidates. Bin
widths are 0.008. There is no significant difference between the two bins around
the threshold of xi,t = 1.
I test the assumption that bare losers provide a valid counterfactual for
bare winners by examining whether the groups differ in pre-treatment co-
variates. Any significant differences in these covariates may invalidate the
causal inference relating to the incumbency effect. I test for continuity at the
incumbency threshold for the following covariates; the candidate held a seat
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in Da´il E´ireann at any time prior to election t, the candidate was a member
of the Fianna Fa´il party at t-1, the candidate was part of the ruling govern-
ment at t-1, the candidate won election t-1 and the quota at election t. The
results are shown in Table 7. There is no statistically significant difference
between bare winners and bare losers for any of the covariates when tested
using both the parametric and non-parametric procedure.
Table 7: Covariate Balance Between Bare Winners and Losers
Parametric Non-Parametric
Specification Specification
Held seat prior to election t 0.03 0.08
(0.07) (0.08)
Member of FF at t-1 -0.07 -0.06
(0.07) (0.06)
Member of Ruling Party at t-1 0.01 0.11
(0.07) (0.07)
Won Election t-1 0.05 0.11
(0.06) (0.08)
Quota at Election t 51 24
(155) (150)
Notes: I test for covariate balance between bare winners and bare losers on
five pre-treatment covariates using both the parametric and non-parametric
specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%. **
significant at 5%. *significant at 10%.
Finally, I rerun the parametric estimation procedure and include the pre-
treatment covariates as additional regressors. If bare winners and bare losers
are comparable then the original estimates should not be sensitive to the
inclusion of the additional covariates. From Table 8 it is clear that adding
the extra covariates does not change the original results.
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Table 8: Inclusion of Pre-Treatment Covariates
Difference in Probability Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers
Covariates Covariates
Omitted Included
Pr(Victory at t+1) 0.18*** 0.18**
(0.08) (0.08)
Pr(Rerunning at t+1) 0.16*** 0.14**
(0.06) (0.07)
Observations 1,600 1,600
Notes: Pretreatment covariates are included as regressors in the parametric
estimation procedure and results are reported. The same results are obtained
regardless of whether the covariates are included are not. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. *significant
at 10%.
The robustness and validity tests provide evidence that RDD is a valid
methodology to test for incumbency advantage in Irish elections. There is no
indication that incumbent sorting occurs around the incumbency threshold.
As pointed out by Caughey and Sekhon (2011) RDD may be more suitable
to multiparty electoral systems where the incumbency threshold is difficult
to predict. Ireland may provide such a setting. Unlike incumbent politicians
in the U.S. Congress, Irish incumbents may not have precise information as
to the number of votes needed to secure close elections due to uncertainties
surrounding the calculated quota for the constituency and vote transfers.
1.6 Conclusion
Incumbent politicians may enjoy an incumbency advantage due to direct
and indirect officeholder benefits. Direct benefits include free postage, free
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telephone, free printing and greater media exposure. Indirect benefits in-
volve the incumbent’s ability to deter high quality challengers. The study of
incumbency advantage in the Irish political system is of particular interest
given the incentives facing incumbent politicians in the PR-STV electoral
setting. Candidates from the same party must compete against one another
and as such need to identify themselves as separate from their parties. An
incumbent may achieve this by taking full advantage of perks of office such
as free postage and printing in order to boost her personal profile among
constituents. It is true that incumbent politicians in Ireland enjoy one of the
highest rates of re-election in the world. However this on its own does not
provide evidence of an incumbency advantage. High re-election rates may
be driven in part by a selection effect; incumbents must be of high enough
quality to win an election in the first place in order to become an incumbent.
Separating officeholder benefits from selection effects poses a challenge due
to unobservable candidate quality which may lead to omitted variable bias.
This paper overcomes this bias by using a regression discontinuity design
to exploit the near-random assignment of incumbency generated by close
elections in Ireland’s lower house of parliament. In doing so, I find officeholder
benefits have a significant causal effect on an incumbent’s chances of re-
election. Bare winners of an election at time t are 18 percentage points more
likely to enjoy electoral success at time t+1 compared to bare losers. There
is also a strong deterrence effect of incumbency as it poses a barrier to the
re-entry of challengers. Bare winners of an election at time t are sixteen
percentage points more likely to rerun at time t+1. The estimates reported
are robust to various parametric and non-parametric specifications.
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Chapter 2
Incumbent-Challenger Versus Open Seat Elections in a
Spatial Model of Political Competition
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Abstract
I study open seat and incumbent-challenger elections in a model of spa-
tial electoral competition. Candidates are policy motivated and may differ
in their non-policy attributes which are collectively referred to as valence
characteristics. Candidates adopt more divergent policies in the incumbent-
challenger election compared to an open seat contest and the divergence is
higher when the challenger, as opposed to the incumbent, possesses the va-
lence advantage. Policy motivated incumbents benefit from an incumbency
advantage in being able to choose their policy before the challenger. Finally,
if a candidate’s valence advantage exceeds a certain threshold then ideolog-
ical shirking occurs as the candidate pursues her own ideology rather than
the constituent’s interests.
2.1 Introduction
In studying the political economy of electoral competition, three areas have
received a great deal of attention by economists and congressional scholars;
the policy divergence puzzle, incumbency advantage and ideological shirking.
I address each of these strands of literature in a single model of spatial
electoral competition.
Downs (1957) shows that office motivated candidates converge to the
median voter. However in reality candidates and parties typically adopt
divergent policies. The challenge is to reconcile theory with empirical ev-
idence. This paper contributes to the literature on policy divergence by
comparing incumbent-challenger and open seat elections using a version of
the Groseclose (2001) model in which candidates are policy motivated and
possess asymmetric valence.1 I show that policy divergence is greater in
the incumbent-challenger election compared to the open seat election and
is greatest when the challenger has the valence advantage. The theoretical
predictions of the model may help explain inconsistencies in the empirical
literature regarding candidate positioning in incumbent-challenger elections.
Ansolabehere et al. (2001) find that incumbents are more moderate than chal-
lengers. However Burden (2004) directly contradicts this result in separate
work which shows that incumbents are more extreme than challengers. The
theoretical results presented in this paper may help to explain this puzzle; if
the incumbent has a small valence advantage or a valence disadvantage then
the incumbent adopts a more extreme position than a challenger, consistent
1Valence may consist of non-policy characteristics such as competence, integrity, intel-
ligence and dedication to public service.
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with Burden (2004), however if the incumbent possesses a large valence ad-
vantage over the challenger then the incumbent is more moderate, consistent
with Ansolabehere et al. (2001).
A vast literature exists which explores incumbency advantage in terms of
direct officeholder benefits, such as free postage, telephone and initial voter
disposition and indirect officeholder benefits which include the incumbent’s
ability to scare off high quality challengers.2 These benefits typically help
an incumbent by boosting their re-election probability. The second contribu-
tion of this paper is to show an alternative channel of incumbency advantage
which comes from the incumbent’s ability to announce policy before a chal-
lenger. This first-mover advantage means that an incumbent generates a
higher expected utility compared to being a challenger or a candidate in an
open-seat. So in addition to direct and indirect officeholder benefits which
may boost the incumbent’s probability of victory, I show a separate advan-
tage which boosts the incumbent’s utility by helping to generate a more
desirable policy outcome. The ability to locate first is especially desirable to
a valence disadvantaged candidate as it allows them to mitigate some of this
disadvantage.
The third contribution is to show ideological shirking in a spatial model
of electoral competition with valence asymmetry. Ideological shirking oc-
curs when a candidate ”shirks” her duty to represent the ideology of her
constituents and instead pursues her own personal policy agenda. This can
2For empirical papers on this type of incumbency advantage see Uppal (2010), Lee
(2008), Redmond and Regan (2013) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997). Pastine and Pastine
(2012) and Meirowitz (2008) have theoretical models on incumbency advantage and the
implications for campaign finance reform.
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be seen as a principal-agent problem in which the politician (agent) fails to
act in the best interest of the voter (principal).3 A candidate with a small
valence advantage moderates towards the centre of the policy space in the
direction of the expected median voter. However once a candidate’s valence
advantage exceeds a certain threshold the candidate begins to move away
from the location of the expected median voter and back in the direction of
her own policy preference. Her high valence allows her to engage in ideolog-
ical shirking by adopting a position which may not be representative of her
constituents but still allows her to win the election.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1.1 reviews some closely related
literature. Section 2.2 presents the model and Section 2.3 shows the candi-
date’s reaction functions and how to solve for the open seat and incumbent-
challenger equilibria. Section 2.4 presents the results. In Section 2.5 I show
the results are robust to an alternative specification in which a candidate’s
advantage does not come from a valence endowment but rather from the elec-
torate being ideologically predisposed to the candidate’s policy preference.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Downs (1957) draws on Hotelling’s (1929) famous model of spatial compe-
tition to examine the policy location choice of two office motivated political
parties competing in a one dimensional policy space. The competition be-
tween Downsian political parties is analogous to that of Hotelling’s firms;
3This is analagous to shirking models in labour economics where employees (agents)
act in their own interest by shirking their duties at the expense of the employer (principal).
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parties strive to locate as close to the preferred policies of as many voters as
possible much like Hotelling’s firms locate as close to as many customers as
possible. In the Downsian setup convergence to the median voter is a Nash
equilibrium − if either party deviates from this point they will lose votes to
the opposition.
However contrary to the predictions of Downs (1957), political parties
and candidates typically adopt divergent as opposed to convergent policy
positions as shown by Poole and Rosenthal (1984, 1997) and McCarty et al.
(2006). Recent contributions to the literature have extended the Downsian
model to reconcile theory with empirical evidence. The recognition that vot-
ers value more than just the policy choice of political candidates has been
key in making the Downsian model more realistic. Voters may value traits
which are unrelated to policy such as competence, integrity and communica-
tion skills. These non-policy characteristics are often referred to as “valence”
characteristics following Stokes (1963). The introduction of policy motivated
candidates, as pioneered by Wittman (1973, 1977, 1983), has also added to
the realism of theoretical models. Wittman (1977) argues that policy moti-
vation is a more reasonable assumption than vote maximization as the latter
generates the perverse result in which the only participants in the model who
are not interested in policy are the candidates. In the traditional Downsian
model, candidates view policy as a means to winning. Wittman (1977) ar-
gues that the reverse may be true − candidates view winning as a means to
policy. Groseclose (2001) incorporates valence and varying degrees of pol-
icy motivation into a single model of spatial competition and generates the
realistic outcome of policy divergence focusing on a simultaneous move game.
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Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and Krasa and Polborn (2012) also em-
ploy a simultaneous move game. This type of model may be consistent with
an open-seat election in which neither candidate is an incumbent. However
Wiseman (2006) suggests that in non-open seat elections the incumbent’s
policy position is typically chosen before the challengers. As such, a sequen-
tial move game involving a first-moving incumbent may be appropriate to
consider incumbent-challenger elections.
Berger et al. (2000), Ingberman (1992) and Bernhardt and Ingberman
(1985) consider incumbent-challenger elections where vote maximizing can-
didates compete in a model where reputation matters and incumbents are
perceived as less risky than a challenger when it comes to implementing
a pre-election promise. However Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) find the
incumbent-challenger equilibrium is the same as the simultaneous move equi-
librium which does not always exist. In Berger et al. (2000) the incumbent
is forced to run on a fixed record as opposed to choosing a policy point. In
Anderson and Glomm (1992) the candidates are policy motivated only to
the extent that they dislike compromising their own ideal point. If a can-
didate loses the election she gets zero utility regardless of the policy of the
opponent. Anderson and Glomm (1992) find that incumbents only benefit
from a first-mover advantage if they also enjoy a sizeable valence advantage.
Wiseman (2006) considers policy motivated candidates with endogenous va-
lence which can be increased by costly campaign support. Wiseman (2006)
employs a deterministic model with complete and perfect information. In
Palfrey (1984) and Weber (1992), two dominant parties choose policies si-
multaneously while anticipating entry of a third party. The two dominant
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parties play a Cournot-Nash game and both are Stackelberg leaders with
regard to the third party. Candidates are vote maximizers and there is no
valence dimension. The dominant parties choose divergent platforms and the
third party typically loses.
Ideological shirking occurs when a candidate pursues their own ideology
rather than their constituents’ interests as in Kau and Rubin (1993). Berger
et al. (2000) and Yakovlev (2011) illustrate ideological shirking in a rep-
utational model where risk averse voters prefer the more well known and
predictable incumbent as opposed to the lesser known challenger.
2.2 The Model
A left-wing candidate L and a right-wing candidate R compete by choos-
ing policies from a one dimensional policy space with candidate c ∈ {L,R}
choosing a policy Pc ∈ [−1, 1]. In the incumbent-challenger election, the
incumbent L chooses her policy position P IL before the challenger. The chal-
lenger R observes the incumbent’s policy and reacts by choosing a policy
position PCR . The timing of the game is different in an open seat election as
both the left and right wing candidates simultaneously choose their policies
PL∗ and PR∗ respectively.
Voters derive utility from a candidate’s exogenous valence endowment as
well as the proximity of the candidate’s chosen policy platform to the voter’s
ideal point. If both candidates choose the same policy platform the voter
prefers the candidate with the higher valence. The utility of voter i with
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ideal point mi if candidate c∈{L,R} wins is
Ui(Pc, vc) = vc − (Pc −mi)2 (1)
where vc is the valence and Pc the policy choice of candidate c.
4 The candi-
date who captures the median voter wins the election. The election outcome
is probabilistic due to incomplete information about the median voter. The
candidates do not know the median voter’s exact location but they know the
median voter is drawn from a continuous uniform distribution with support
[−1, 1]. The cumulative distribution function is denoted by F (·).
For every combination of candidate policy choices and valence endow-
ments, there exists a unique point on the policy space at which the voter is
indifferent between the two candidates. I denote the indifferent voter as mβ.
The probability that candidate L wins is the probability that the median
voter lies to the left of the indifferent voter, F (mβ). The probability that R
wins is 1−F (mβ). An expression for the indifferent voter mβ is obtained by
equating the voter utility for candidate L with that of candidate R,
vL − (PL −mβ)2 = vR − (PR −mβ)2 (2)
Defining v = vL − vR and solving for mβ yields the following expression,
mβ =
v − P 2L + P 2R
2(PR − PL) (3)
4Voter preferences are quadratic on the policy space and voter utility is separable in
valence and policy as in Wiseman (2006), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Adams et al.
(2011), Ashworth and de Mesquita (2009).
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By using equation (3) in the uniform CDF I can define L’s probability of
victory as follows,
F (mβ) =
1
2
− v − P
2
L + P
2
R
4PL − 4PR ,mβ ∈ [−1, 1] (4)
Lemma 1
∂F (mβ)
∂v
> 0 and
∂F (mβ)
∂PL
> 0. If PR ≥ mβ then ∂F (mβ)∂PR > 0.
Proof : See appendix.
An increase in L’s valence advantage leads to an increase in L’s probabil-
ity of victory. With higher valence L becomes a more appealing candidate
which increases her probability of capturing the median voter. A move by L
towards the centre of the policy space also increases her probability of vic-
tory.5 Similarly, a move by R to the right increases L’s chances of winning
provided that R’s location is to the right of the indifferent voter. This is
always the case − if R found himself to the left of the indifferent voter then
he could alter his position by moving right which would actually improve his
probability of victory while at the same time allowing him to locate closer to
his ideal point.
Candidates are purely policy motivated; that is they place no intrinsic
value on holding office and view it simply as a means to implementing policy
as in Wittman (1973 & 1977) and Wiseman (2006). Traditional Downsian
models of political competition typically assume vote maximizing candidates.
However Wittman (1973 & 1977) argues that policy motivation is a more rea-
sonable assumption as the assumption of vote maximizing candidates gener-
5Recall that in a Downsian model the vote maximizing candidate moves to the centre
of the policy space to maximize his vote share.
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ates the perverse result in which the only participants in the model who are
not interested in policy are the candidates themselves. Wittman also con-
siders analagous models of profit maximzing firms to support the argument
for policy motivated candidates. For example a firm typically does not seek
to maximize sales, but rather maximizes profits. Depending on the market
structure the firm might choose to sell fewer cars at a higher price. Likewise it
may be the case that the candidate or party does not seek to maximize votes
but rather maximizes expected utility with the real winner of the election
being the candidate who gets closest to their preferred policy rather than the
candidate with the most votes.
Following an election, the utility of candidate c∈{L,R} with ideal policy
position xc is
Vc = −(Pw − xc)2 (5)
where Pw is the policy location of the winning candidate.
6 As in Groseclose
(2001) I assume that candidate ideal points are symmetric about the expected
median voter. Candidate L’s ideal point is xL=-1 and candidate R’s ideal
point is xR=1. If we take the view that candidates are chosen by parties then
xL and xR can be interpreted as the ideal points of the median members from
two polarized parties.
Candidate c∈{L,R} chooses a policy position to maximize the following
6If we consider L and R to be ideologically opposed parties then the model does not
preclude office motivated candidates. As noted by Wiseman (2006), in order to win the
party’s endorsement a candidate may accept the platform offered to them by the party. As
such candidates may be office motivated but are subject to the party’s “take-it-or-leave-it”
policy platform.
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pre-election expected utility function,
EUc = F (mβ)[−(PL − xc)2] + (1− F (mβ))[−(PR − xc)2] (6)
When c = L candidate L chooses PL to maximize equation (6). Likewise
when c = R candidate R chooses PR.
2.3 Reaction Functions
I begin by assuming that any valence advantage that exists accrues to can-
didate L with v = vL − vR ≥ 0.7 Valence is categorized as “low” or “high”.
With a low valence advantage L’s policy does not guarantee victory in the
election. However if valence is high enough to exceed a certain threshold de-
noted v then the equilibrium outcome results in L winning with a probability
of one.
Lemma 2 Define v as the level of valence advantage such that if v ≥ v
then F (mβ) = 1 meaning L guarantees victory in equilibrium in both the
incumbent-challenger and open seat elections. Furthermore, it is shown that
L’s policy choice always lies within PL ∈ [−1, 1−
√
v]
Proof : See appendix.
If 0 < v < v then interior solutions, defined as −1 < PL < 1−
√
v, exist for
both the incumbent-challenger and open seat contest. Corner solutions occur
7I relax this assumption in Section 2.4.3 by considering elections in which the incumbent
L has a valence disadvantage such that vL − vR < 0.
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when L possesses a high valence advantage (v ≥ v). In what follows I focus
on the low valence case. This is of primary interest as neither candidate
is guaranteed of victory and different outcomes are observed in the open
seat and incumbent-challenger elections. Moreover in reality close elections
are generally more interesting compared to one-sided elections where the
outcome is a foregone conclusion. Nonetheless the high valence case with
corner solutions is interesting in itself as it leads to ideological shirking and
is considered in Section 4.2.
In the open seat election both candidates simultaneously choose a pol-
icy position to maximize their expected utility. Candidate c∈{L,R} chooses
Pc to maximize equation (6). The first order condition of the optimization
problem ∂EUc
∂Pc
yields the reaction function for candidate c∈{L,R} − the can-
didate’s optimal response to each possible policy choice by their opponent.
L’s reaction function is,
RL(PR, v) = −4
3
+
2(PR
2 + 2PR + .75v + 1)
1/2
3
− PR
3
(7)
and R’s reaction function is,
RR(PL, v) =
4
3
− 2(PL
2 − 2PL − .75v + 1)1/2
3
− PL
3
(8)
A simultaneous move Nash Equilibrium is a pair of policy positions (PL∗, PR∗)
such that
PL∗ = RL(PR∗, v), PR∗ = RR(PL∗, v) (9)
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From this it follows that PL∗ and PR∗ are implicitly defined by
PL∗ = RL(RR(PL∗, v), v) (10)
PR∗ = RR(RL(PR∗, v), v) (11)
Proposition 1 ∂RL(PR,v)
∂PR
> 0 and ∂RR(PL,v)
∂PL
> 0. A move along the policy line
by a candidate causes their opponent to react by moving in the same direc-
tion. ∂RL(PR,v)
∂v
> 0 and ∂RR(PL,v)
∂v
> 0. An increase in L’s valence advantage
causes L to moderate her position and R to move to the right.
Proof : See appendix.
The more right-wing R’s policy is the more L moves towards the centre to
reduce the likelihood of R winning and implementing a distasteful right-wing
policy. This is illustrated by the upward sloping reaction functions in Figure
1.8 The point at which the reaction functions cross is the Nash equilibrium
from the simultaneous move game.
With an increased valence advantage L moderates her position to drive
home her advantage by locating closer to her opponent. Consider two candi-
dates who adopt similar policies but one candidate has a valence advantage.
The voters observe that neither candidate differs greatly on policy and there-
fore valence becomes the deciding factor in the voter’s decision. Therefore L
8There is strategic complementarity in policy; a move along the policy line by one
candidate induces the other candidate to move in the same direction. See Bulow et.
al (1985) and Vives (2005) for a detailed discussion on strategic complementarities in
economics.
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Figure 1: Reaction Functions
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Figure 1: If 0 ≤ v < v a movement along the policy line by a candidate causes
their opponent to react by moving in the same direction, hence the upward
sloping reaction functions. An increase in L’s valence advantage shifts L’s reaction
function from L1 to L2 and R’s reaction function from R1 to R2.
is willing to move away from her ideal point towards the centre of the policy
space as she is compensated by a large increase in the probability of victory.
Furthermore, an increase in L’s valence advantage causes R to move further
right. R figures that his chances of winning are small and as such decides
he might as well locate closer to his ideal point. The effect of an increase in
valence is illustrated by the shifting reaction functions in Figure 1.
In the sequential move game the incumbent L takes the challenger R’s
optimal response into consideration when choosing policy. Substituting R’s
reaction function, equation (8), into L’s expected utility function gives,
EU IL(P
I
L, v) = F (mβ(P
I
L, v, RR(P
I
L, v)))[−(P IL − (−1))2]
+ (1− F (mβ(P IL, v, RR(P IL, v))))[−(RR(P IL, v)− (−1))2] (12)
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and using equations (4) and (8) in equation (12) gives,
EU IL(P
I
L, v) =
v
2
− 14P
I
L
9
+
vP IL
6
+ (
2P IL
9
− 2
9
)
√
4P IL
2 − 8P IL − 3v + 4
+
(4P IL
2 − 8P IL − 3v + 4)3/2
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− P IL2 −
4P IL
3
27
− 35
27
(13)
The utility maximization problem for L yields the first order condition,
∂EU IL
∂P IL
=
v
6
− 1√
4P IL
2 − 8P IL − 3v + 4
(
16P IL
9
+
8
9
+
8P IL
2
9
)− P IL(2 +
4
9
P IL)
+
2P IL
√
4P IL
2 − 8P IL − 3v + 4
9
− 14
9
= 0 (14)
Implicitly defined in equation (14) is the incumbent’s equilibrium policy lo-
cation P IL for different valence endowments. When P
I
L is known then the
challenger’s response PCR is found using R’s reaction function, equation (8).
Endogenising R’s response in this way enables L to choose a point on R’s
reaction function. L chooses the point which yields the highest utility. This
is the equilibrium from the incumbent-challenger election and occurs where
L’s iso-utility line is tangent to R’s reaction function as shown in Figure 2.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Low Valence Advantage: 0≤v<v
First consider the case where neither candidate has a valence advantage such
that v = 0.
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Figure 2: Incumbent−Challenger and Open Seat Equilibria
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Figure 2: The equilibrium from the open seat and the incumbent-challenger
game with L as the incumbent and first-mover are shown for 0 ≤ v < v. When
L is first mover she chooses a point on R’s reaction function which maximizes
her utility. This is the equilibrium from the incumbent-challenger election and it
occurs where L’s iso-utility line is tangent to R’s reaction function.
Proposition 2 P IL and P
C
R are the incumbent-challenger equilibrium posi-
tions and PL∗ and PR∗ are equilibrium positions from the open seat election.
If v = 0 then P IL = xL = −1, PCR = 13 , PL∗ = −12 and PR∗ = 12 . In the
open seat election F (mβ) = 1− F (mβ) = 0.5 and E(UL∗) = E(UR∗). In the
incumbent-challenger election F (mβ) < 1− F (mβ) and E(U IL) > E(UCR ).
Proof : See appendix.
In the open seat election where both candidates are equal on valence, they
locate symmetrically about the centre of the policy space. However in the
incumbent-challenger election the incumbent as first mover strategically lo-
cates at the far left of the policy space at her ideal point. As this is her
preferred policy location she will obtain maximum utility if she wins. Fur-
thermore, she knows that once her challenger R observes her extreme left
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wing policy choice, he will be forced to moderate away from his ideal right
wing point and locate closer to the policy centre. Therefore even in the event
that L loses, the policy implemented by R is reasonably moderate so as not
to be too detrimental to L’s utility. This strategy results in the incumbent
having a higher expected utility than the challenger despite the fact that the
challenger has a higher probability of victory. However recall that candidates
are policy motivated and winning is simply seen as a means to implementing
policy. Therefore a candidate may accept a lower probability of victory if
the expected policy outcome from the election is more desirable.
As valence increases from zero to a small value then the advantaged candi-
date moderates towards the centre of the policy space and the disadvantaged
candidate moves to a polarized position close to their ideal point. For now
assume L is the advantaged candidate (v = vL − vR ≥ 0).9
Proposition 3 ∂PL∗
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0, ∂PR∗
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0 and
∂P IL
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0,
∂PCR
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0.
Proof : See appendix.
As L benefits from a small valence advantage she moves right to a policy
position closer to the centre and R also moves right to a more polarized
position.
The result showing the advantaged candidate in the simultaneous move
9I consider the alternative case with R as the advantaged candidate in Section 4.3.
Note that in the open seat election where both candidates move simultaneously there is
no loss of generality in conveying the valence advantage on L. If we want to consider what
happens when L is disadvantaged then we simply observe R’s outcomes and reverse the
sign. However in the incumbent-challenger election the outcomes of an election involving
an advantaged incumbent are different to a disadvantaged incumbent.
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game moderating towards the centre has already been shown by Groseclose
(2001) who refers to it as the “moderating frontrunner” result. Likewise
Groseclose (2001) refers to the result in which the disadvantaged candidate
in the simultaneous move game moves away from the centre as the “extremist
underdog” result. I show the moderating frontrunner and extremist underdog
results also occur in the incumbent-challenger election. This is unlike Ander-
son and Glomm (1992) where the advantaged incumbent does not moderate
but moves closer to her ideal point. Note however that in Anderson and
Glomm (1992) the incumbent only cares about compromising her own ideal
point − if the challenger wins then the incumbent gets zero utility regardless
of how extreme the challenger’s position is.
Proposition 4 If 0 ≤ v < v then,
(i) P IL < PL∗ and PCR < PR∗
(ii) |P IL − PCR | > |PL ∗ −PR ∗ |
Proof : See appendix.
The policies of both candidates lie closer to the advantaged candidate’s
ideological preference when that candidate is an incumbent as opposed to an
open seat contestant. Moreover policy divergence is greater in the incumbent-
challenger election − while both the incumbent’s and challenger’s policies are
to the left of the open seat equilibrium, the leftward move by the incumbent
is greater than the challenger’s.10
10Anderson and Glomm (1992) have a different result whereby in an incumbent-
challenger election both candidates adopt a polarized position close to their ideal points.
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2.4.2 High Valence Advantage: v≥v
A candidate with a high valence advantage can deviate from the median
voter’s policy preference without fearing defeat in the election. Put simply,
the candidate has the luxury of indulging her own policy agenda even if this
is not representative of the majority of voters. Kau and Rubin (1993) refer
to this as ideological shirking.
Note that for any given level of valence advantage there is a point at which
L could locate and guarantee victory. I refer to this as a win point denoted
PwinL . To be guaranteed of victory it must be the case that the indifferent
voter, mβ is located at +1 on the policy space. From Lemma 1 we know that
PR ≥ mβ so therefore PR = 1.
Using mβ = PR = +1 in equation (3) and solving for PL gives an expres-
sion for L’s win-point, PwinL = 1 −
√
v. From Lemma 2 we know that this
is the corner solution from the utility maximization problem; L never moves
beyond the win-point as she is already guaranteed of victory at this point.
With a low valence advantage it never makes sense to locate at the the win-
point as to do so would mean L adopting a very right-wing policy. However
when L has a high valence advantage, v ≥ v she maximizes utility at the
corner solution (her win-point) 1−√v in both the incumbent-challenger and
open-seat elections. Her valence is high enough to allow her to locate at her
win-point while maintaining a left-wing position. Once valence exceeds the
threshold v¯ then L can locate at her ideal point at -1 and guarantee victory
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making this the best possible outcome of the election. Any further increase
in valence above v¯ has no effect.11 Therefore if v ≤ v ≤ v¯ then L’s optimal
location is given by,
P IL = PL∗ = 1−
√
v (15)
Proposition 5 If v ≤ v ≤ v¯ then ∂P IL
∂v
= ∂PL∗
∂v
< 0
Proof : ∂(1−
√
v)
∂v
= −1
2
√
v
.
When L’s valence advantage changes from low to high she moves back
along the policy line towards her ideal left-wing point. She engages in ide-
ological shirking; by moving further left she chooses policies further away
from the expected median voter. However even though her policy may not
represent the constituent’s interests she still guarantees victory due to her
high valence.
2.4.3 A Disadvantaged Incumbent
Consider elections in which the challenger (second mover) benefits from the
valence advantage such that v = vL − vR < 0.
Proposition 6 If v = vL − vR < 0 then,
(i)P IL = xL = −1
(ii)|P IL − PCR | is higher compared to when v = vL − vR > 0.
Proof : See appendix.
11Given PwinL = 1−
√
v then v¯ = 4.
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The disadvantaged incumbent locates at the extreme left of the policy
line at her ideal point. Her reasons for doing this are twofold. Firstly, the
disadvantaged incumbent de-emphasizes the importance of her opponents va-
lence advantage by adopting a policy far from the opponent’s. Secondly, as
L is the first mover she knows that if she adopts an extreme left position, her
opponent R will moderate to reduce L’s likelihood of winning. However even
though L chooses an extreme left-wing policy and R chooses a moderately
right-wing policy, the expected policy outcome is right-wing as R’s probabil-
ity of victory is much greater than the L’s. Furthermore, policy divergence
is greatest when the incumbent is disadvantaged.
2.4.4 First Mover Advantage
Proposition 7 If −v < v < v then E(U IL) > E(UL∗) > E(UCL ). The
incumbent benefits from a first-mover advantage irrespective of whether the
incumbent or challenger benefits from the valence advantage.
Proof : See appendix.
There is an incumbency advantage which results from the incumbent’s strate-
gic ability to choose her policy first. The incumbent as first-mover can locate
at, or close to, her ideal policy point and in doing so forces her opponent (the
second-mover) to adopt a more moderate policy position. A candidate’s ex-
pected utility is higher when the candidate is an incumbent as opposed to
a challenger or an open seat contestant for −v < v < v. As discussed pre-
viously, once a candidate’s utility exceeds v the type of election becomes
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irrelevant as the candidate locates at their win-point regardless of the timing
of the policy choice.
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Figure 3: First−Mover Advantage
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Figure 3: Expected utility is plotted for three scenarios in which the candidate
is either an incumbent, challenger or open seat contestant. Note that negative
valence means the candidate is at a valence disadvantage.
Figure 3 shows that a candidate unambiguously benefits from being an
incumbent as opposed to a challenger or open seat candidate for −v < v < v.
Moving second is typically more detrimental for candidates who are at a
valence disadvantage as shown by the magnitude of the gap between the
expected utility from being an incumbent versus a challenger for v < 0. A
candidate with a valence disadvantage can mitigate some of this disadvantage
if they are a first-mover. However if the candidate is valence disadvantaged
and second mover then they take a double hit; not only is the candidate
forced to take up a more distasteful policy position by moderating away
from her ideal point, but she receives little reward for doing so in terms of
her probability of victory.
An additional striking result emerges from Figure 3. A second moving
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challenger at a severe valence disadvantage may generate a higher expected
utility compared to a challenger who scores higher on the valence dimension.
This is shown in Figure 3 by the improvement in expected utility for second
movers as valence advantage declines below -1. Note that unlike elections
in which the candidates are trying to maximize the percentage of votes, the
electoral model used in this paper is a non-zero sum game. For example,
when an incumbent’s valence increases she moderates her position and the
challenger adopts a more extreme position. The incumbent benefits because
she reduces the chances of the challenger winning and implementing a right-
wing policy. In this sense, we can think of the incumbent as being risk
averse; she is willing to moderate away from her ideal point in order to
reduce the risk of a right-wing policy being implemented. Now consider
the challenger. As the incumbent moderates, this is also good news for
the challenger as the worst case scenario (in terms of the possible left-wing
policy that could be introduced) has improved. In addition, the challenger
reacts by moving closer to his ideal position, which again could be good
news if he wins and implements this policy. Of course where the challenger’s
utility disimproves is in his reduced likelihood of winning, but the former
improvement in utility can dominate the latter and this is what happens
for second movers when their valence disadvantage declines below -1. What
is shown in Figure 3 is that when a candidate is severely disadvantaged he
benefits from the incumbent’s desire to moderate significantly.
The implications are very interesting for electoral competition. It reveals
a type of “scare off” effect at an incumbent’s disposal which has not yet
been discussed in the literature. Consider a party tasked with choosing a
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challenger to face an incumbent. The party would rather choose a very weak
candidate (on valence) rather than a “mediocre” candidate as they know the
weak candidate will entice the incumbent to adopt a very centrist policy.
The literature on incumbency advantage typically refers to direct office-
holder benefits and indirect “scare off” effects which arise due to a challenger’s
poor electoral prospects. The first-mover incumbency advantage shown in
this model is separate to any direct officeholder benefits which may accrue
to the incumbent. In addition, it shows that an incumbent may “scare off”
challengers for reasons other than poor electoral prospects; namely weaker
challengers may be fielded to try and entice the incumbent to moderate.
Note that the incumbency advantage in this paper is different from the
traditional Downsian model with office motivated candidates where the can-
didate actually prefers moving second. If a candidate has a valence advantage
and is purely motivated by winning then she would like to first observe her
opponent’s location and guarantee victory by copying this position.
2.4.5 Numerical Examples
I present some numerical examples to help illustrate the theoretical predic-
tions of the model. Table 1 shows the equilibrium electoral outcomes for
both the incumbent-challenger and open seat elections for low valence ad-
vantage 0 ≤ v < v. The incumbent’s policy location is found by substituting
in values for v in equation (14) and solving for P IL. The challenger’s reaction
to the incumbent’s policy is then found by using v and P IL in equation (8).
The equilibria for the open seat elections are found by parameterizing the
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reaction functions with different values of v and solving simultaneously.
Table 1: Small Valence Advantage
Incumbent-Challenger Election v=0 v=0.2 v=0.5 v=0.8 v=1
P IL -1.00 -0.82 -0.67 -0.54 -0.46
PCR 0.33 0.42 0.52 0.63 0.70
Policy Divergence 1.33 1.24 1.19 1.17 1.16
Pr(L wins) 0.33 0.44 0.57 0.69 0.78
Pr(R wins) 0.67 0.56 0.43 0.31 0.22
E(Policy) -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.18 -0.20
E(U IL) -1.19 -1.14 -1.06 -0.96 -0.88
E(UCR ) -1.63 -1.65 -1.68 -1.69 -1.67
Open Seat Election v=0 v=0.2 v=0.5 v=0.8 v=1
PL∗ -0.50 -0.45 -0.38 -0.31 -0.27
PR∗ 0.50 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.81
Policy Divergence 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.08
Pr(L wins) 0.50 0.58 0.69 0.80 0.87
Pr(R wins) 0.50 0.42 0.31 0.20 0.13
E(Policy) 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.13
E(UL∗) -1.25 -1.20 -1.10 -0.99 -0.90
E(UR∗) -1.25 -1.30 -1.35 -1.38 -1.40
Table 1 shows that while moving first boosts a candidate’s expected utility
it does not mean L has an increased chance of victory, in fact the opposite
is the case. Recall that candidates place no intrinsic value on holding office
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and therefore accept a lower probability of victory if this means improving
the post-election policy outcome.
Table 2 shows results for high valence advantage, v ≥ v. PL is calculated
using equation (15) and PL is then used in R’s reaction function, equation
(8), to find PR. Recall that when v ≥ v the incumbent-challenger and open
seat elections produce the same outcome as L locates at the corner solution
1 − √v in both. With a high valence advantage L engages in ideological
shirking. As the valence advantage increases L can locate closer to her ideal
point on the far left of the policy line and still guarantee victory even though
this may not be representative of the majority of voters. Note that when
v = 4 there is maximum policy divergence and also maximum divergence in
candidate utility; the furthest left-wing policy is certain to be implemented
making this the best possible outcome for L and the worst possible outcome
for R.
Table 2: High Valence Advantage
v=1.5 v=2 v=3 v=4
PL -.225 -.414 -.732 -1
PR 1 1 1 1
Policy Divergence 1.225 1.414 1.732 2
Pr(L wins) 1 1 1 1
Pr(R wins) 0 0 0 0
E(Policy) -.225 -.414 -.732 -1
E(UL) -0.601 -0.343 -0.072 0
E(UR) -1.500 -2.000 -3.000 -4
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Table 3 shows numerical examples when the incumbent is at a valence
disadvantage (v < 0). Comparing Table 3 with the incumbent-challenger
election in Table 1 we clearly see that policy divergence is greater when
the incumbent is at a valence disadvantage. Note also that the incumbent
benefits from a first-mover advantage regardless of whether she is valence
advantaged or not.
Table 3: A Disadvantaged Incumbent, v<0
Incumbent-Challenger Election v=-0.2 v=-0.5 v=-0.8 v=-1
P IL -1,00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
PCR 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.21
Policy Divergence 1.31 1.27 1.24 1.21
Pr(L wins) 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.10
Pr(R wins) 0.71 0.78 0.85 0.90
E(Policy) -0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.09
E(U IL) -1.22 -1.26 -1.30 -1.33
E(UCR ) -1.50 -1.29 -1.09 -0.95
Tables 1-3 provide an insight which may help explain some empirical ir-
regularities in empirical work on incumbent-challenger positioning. When the
incumbent’s valence advantage is low or when she is at a valence disadvantage
then her position is more extreme than the challenger’s. This is consistent
with empirical work of Burden (2004). However when the incumbent has a
high valence advantage then we get the opposite result in which she is more
moderate than the challenger. This is consistent withAnsolabehere et al.
(2001). Furthermore the predictions of the model are consistent with the
72
finding of Ansolabehere et al. (2001) that high quality non-incumbents are
more moderate than other non-incumbents. Table 1 shows that as the qual-
ity of non-incumbents (either challengers or open seat candidates) declines
relative to the incumbent their policy becomes more extreme.
2.5 A Partisan Electorate
Proposition 8 If L benefits from a favourable partisan electorate then the
equilibrium outcomes are consistent with the results of elections in which L
has a valence advantage. Specifically,
(i) P IL < PL∗ and PCR < PR∗
(ii) |P IL − PCR | > |PL ∗ −PR ∗ |
(iii)E(U IL) > E(UL∗)
Proof : See appendix.
The main results of the paper hold when a candidate’s advantage comes from
a partisan electorate as opposed to a valence endowment. To represent this
partisan advantage, I allow the median voter to be a random draw from the
triangular distribution shown in Figure 4 such that candidate L benefits from
the partisan electorate.
Certain districts may contain a population which inherently favours left or
right wing policies making the electorate predisposed to a certain candidate
or party − so called “blue states” and “red states” in the case of American
politics.
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Figure 4: Partisan Distribution of Median Voters
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Figure 4: The median voter is a random draw from the triangular distribution
with support [-1,1].
2.6 Conclusion
Spatial electoral competition with policy motivated candidates can produce
different electoral outcomes depending on the timing of policy announce-
ments. It may be reasonable to assume that an open seat contest involves
candidates announcing policy simultaneously whereas an incumbent typically
announces policy before a challenger.
Compared to being a candidate in an open-seat, an incumbent typically
locates closer to her ideal policy position which forces the challenger to mod-
erate towards the expected median voter. The resulting policy divergence
from the incumbent-challenger election is higher than in an open seat con-
test and the incumbent enjoys a first-mover advantage. This result holds
in the model of asymmetric valence but I also show that it holds when one
of the candidates has a non-valence advantage arising from a partisan elec-
torate whereby the distribution of voters in a district is tilted in favour of
the incumbent.
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If the incumbent benefits from a high valence advantage then ideological
shirking occurs. The candidate is so far ahead on valence that she can pursue
her own policy agenda without fearing defeat in the election even if her policy
is very far from the median voter’s ideal point.
There is a strand of literature exploring incumbency advantage which
arises due to direct and indirect officeholder benefits which boosts an incum-
bent’s reelection prospects. I highlight an additional source of incumbency
advantage which takes the form of a first-mover advantage. The incumbent’s
ability to locate before the challenger boosts the incumbent’s expected utility
by generating a more favourable policy outcome.
Appendix
Lemma 1
∂F (mβ)
∂v
> 0 and
∂F (mβ)
∂PL
> 0. If PR ≥ mβ then ∂F (mβ)∂PR > 0.
Proof.
∂F (mβ)
∂v
= −1
(4PL−4PR) > 0 as PL < 0 and PR > 0.
∂F (mβ)
∂PL
=
v
4(PL−PR)2 +
1
4
> 0.
∂F (mβ)
∂PR
= 1
4
− v
4(PL−PR)2 > 0 if v ≤ (PL − PR)2. Given
mβ =
v − P 2L + P 2R
2(PR − PL) it is straightforward to show that the inequality v ≤
(PL − PR)2 is the same as PR ≥ mβ. It cannot be that PR < mβ because
then
∂F (mβ)
∂PR
< 0 meaning that R could locate closer to her preferred point
while at the same time increasing her probability of victory. Therefore R
never locates to the left of the indifferent voter.
Lemma 2 Define v as the level of valence advantage such that if v ≥ v
then F (mβ) = 1 meaning L guarantees victory in equilibrium in both the
incumbent-challenger and open seat elections. Furthermore, it is shown that
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L’s policy choice always lies within PL ∈ [−1, 1−
√
v]
Proof. L has a 100 percent probability of victory when mβ = 1. From
Lemma 1 we know that PR ≥ mβ so if mβ = 1 then PR = 1. Using
PR = mβ = 1 in equation (4) gives the policy point which L can locate
and guarantee victory which is a function of valence, PwinL = 1−
√
v. Clearly
L will never move further right beyond this point as she is already guaranteed
of victory so therefore PL ∈ [−1, 1−
√
v]. Using PR = 1 in L’s utility function
and taking the first order condition ∂EUL
∂PL
yields v
4
− 5PL
2
− 3P 2L
4
− 3
4
= 0. Using
PL = 1−
√
v and solving for v gives v = 1.37. Therefore when v ≥ 1.37 L is
guaranteed victory so v = 1.37.
Proposition 1 ∂RL(PR,v)
∂PR
> 0 and ∂RR(PL,v)
∂PL
> 0. A move along the policy line
by a candidate causes their opponent to react by moving in the same direc-
tion. ∂RL(PR,v)
∂v
> 0 and ∂RR(PL,v)
∂v
> 0. An increase in L’s valence advantage
causes L to moderate her position and R to move to the right.
Proof : ∂RL(PR,v)
∂PR
= 4PR+4
3
√
4P 2R+8PR+3v+4
− 1
3
> 0 when PR > 0 and v < 1.37.
∂RR(PL,v)
∂PL
= − 4PL−4
3
√
4P 2L−8PL−3v+4
− 1
3
> 0 when PL < 0 and v < 1.37.
∂RL(PR,v)
∂v
=
1
2
√
4P 2R+8PR+3v+4
> 0 and ∂RR(PL,v)
∂v
= 1
2
√
4P 2L−8PL−3v+4
> 0.
Proposition 2 P IL and P
C
R are the equilibrium positions from the incumbent-
challenger election and PL∗ and PR∗ are the equilibrium positions from the
open seat election. If v = 0 then P IL = xL = −1, PCR = 13 and PL∗ = −12 ,
PR∗ = 12 . In the open seat election F (mβ) = 1−F (mβ) = 0.5 and E(UL∗) =
E(UR∗). In the incumbent-challenger election F (mβ) < 1 − F (mβ) and
E(U IL) > E(U
C
R ).
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Proof : If v = 0 the reaction functions simplify to RL(PR, v) =
−2+PR
3
and
RR(PL, v) =
2+PL
3
. Solving the equations simultaneously gives the policy
locations for the open-seat election as PL∗ = −0.5 and PR∗ = 0.5. For the
incumbent-challenger election I substitute v = 0 into the incumbent’s first
order condition, equation (14), and solve to give P IL = −1. Using this in R’s
reaction function gives RR(PL, v) =
2+(−1)
3
= 1
3
so PCR =
1
3
. For the open
seat election, using v = 0, PL∗ = −0.5 and PR∗ = 0.5 in equation (4) gives
F (mβ) = 1 − F (mβ) = 0.5. From equation (6) E(UL∗) = E(UR∗) = −1.25.
For the incumbent-challenger election equation (4) gives F (mβ) = .33 and
1− F (mβ) = .67. From equation (6) E(U IL) = −1.19 and E(UCR ) = −1.63.
Proposition 3 ∂PL∗
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0, ∂PR∗
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0 and
∂P IL
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0,
∂PCR
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0.
Proof : From equations (9) and (10), PL∗ = RL(PR∗, v) = RL(RR(PL∗, v), v).
Taking the partial derivative with respect to v gives ∂PL∗
∂v
= ∂RL
∂RR
∂RR
∂PL∗
∂PL∗
∂v
+
∂RL
∂RR
∂RR
∂v
+ ∂RL
∂v
. Solving for ∂PL∗
∂v
gives the expression, ∂PL∗
∂v
=
∂RL
∂PR
∂RR
∂v
+
∂RL
∂v
1− ∂RL
∂PR
∂RR
∂PL
.
I determine the sign of ∂PL∗
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
by analyzing the RHS terms. ∂RL
∂PR
∣∣∣∣
v=0
=
2PR+2
3
√
P 2R+2PR+1
− 1
3
> 0. ∂RR
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= 1
4
√
P 2L−2PL+1
> 0. ∂RL
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= 1
4
√
P 2R+2PR+1
>
0. ∂RR
∂PL
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= − 2PL−2
3
√
P 2L−2PL+1
− 1
3
> 0. Finally, ∂P̂L
∂PR
∂P̂R
∂PL
< 1 so 1− ∂P̂L
∂PR
∂P̂R
∂PL
> 0
and therefore ∂PL∗
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0. In the same way it can be shown that ∂PR∗
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
>
0. For the incumbent-challenger election recall from Proposition 2 that when
v = 0, P IL = −1. Using this in the incumbent’s first order condition, equation
(14), gives
∂EUIL
∂P IL
∣∣∣∣
P IL=−1
= 1
6
(v( 4√
16−3v + 1)). Clearly when v = 0 this equation
equals zero as utility is maximized. However notice that when v goes from
zero to a positive value we have
∂EUIL
∂P IL
> 0 meaning candidate L moves to the
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right to increase her utility. Therefore
∂P IL
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0. We have already seen
that ∂RR
∂PL
> 0 so as the incumbent L moves right so too does the challenger
R and as such
∂PCR
∂v
∣∣∣∣
v=0
> 0.
Proposition 4 If 0 ≤ v < v then,
(i) P IL < PL∗ and PCR < PR∗
(ii) |P IL − PCR | > |PL ∗ −PR ∗ |
Proof : (i) The incumbent’s expected utility function is written as EU IL(P
I
L, R
C
R
(P IL, v), v). The first order condition for the expected utility optimization
problem is
∂EUIL
∂P IL
=
∂EUIL
∂P IL
+
∂EUIL
∂RCR
∂RCR
∂P IL
. Evaluating the FOC at the open seat
equilibrium position PL∗ means that the first term on the RHS of the FOC
satisfies L’s open seat utility optimization problem,
∂EUIL
∂P IL
∣∣∣∣
PL∗
. Therefore the
sign of the second term,
∂EUIL
∂RCR
∂RCR
∂P IL
tells us whether, as an incumbent, L can
improve her utility by locating at a point which is different to the open seat
election.
∂EUIL
∂RCR
= −P IL
2
4
+
P ILP
C
R
2
+
3PCR
2
4
+ v
4
− 1 < 0 if −1 ≤ P IL < 1 −
√
v.
In the proof of Proposition 1 I show that ∂RR
∂PL
> 0. Therefore
∂EUIL
∂RCR
∂RCR
∂P IL
< 0
meaning when L is the incumbent she does better by locating to the left
of her open seat position so P IL < PL∗. From Proposition 1, ∂RR(PL,v)∂PL > 0
meaning that P IL < PL∗ implies PCR < PR∗. (ii) It is straightforward to show
that 0 < ∂RR
∂PL
< 1 so a move to the left by L causes R to move to the left by
a smaller amount. Given P IL < PL∗ it must be that |P IL−PCR | > |PL ∗−PR ∗ |
Proposition 6 Define v = vL − vR < 0. Then,
(i)P IL = xL = −1
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(ii)|P IL − PCR | is higher compared to when v = vL − vR > 0.
Proof. If v = 0 then P IL = −1. The incumbent’s expected utility function is
EU IL(P
I
L, R
C
R(P
I
L, v), v). From this,
∂EUIL
∂P IL
∣∣∣∣
P IL=−1
= v
6
+ 32
9
√
16−3v − 2
√
16−3v
9
. In
this equation v = vL− vR so when the incumbent is at a disadvantage v < 0.
If v < 0 then
∂EUIL
∂P IL
∣∣∣∣
P IL=−1
< 0. As the incumbent becomes disadvantaged she
would like to move further left than P IL = −1 however this is not possible
as PL ∈ [−1, 1 −
√
v]. The furthest left-wing policy choice available is -1.
Therefore L stays at the extreme left of the policy line. For (ii), note that
∂RR
∂P IL
=
4PCR+4
3
√
4PCR
2
+8PCR+3v+4
− 1
3
giving 0 <
∂RCR
∂P IL
< 1. A move to the left by L
causes R to move left by less than L. Given that the disadvantaged incumbent
locates further left compared to when she is advantaged, it is the case that
|P incL −P chaR | is higher for v = vL−vR < 0 compared to when v = vL−vR > 0.
Proposition 7 If −1.37 < v < 1.37 then E(U IL) > E(UL∗) > E(UCL ). The
incumbent benefits from a first-mover advantage. This is true irrespective of
whether the incumbent or challenger benefits from the valence advantage.
Proof : This follows directly from Proposition 4 and its proof. When a can-
didate is an incumbent she locates further left than her open seat equilibrium
resulting in a higher expected utility.
Proposition 8 If L benefits from a favourable partisan electorate then the
equilibrium outcomes are consistent with the results of elections in which L
has a valence advantage. Specifically,
(i) P IL < PL∗ and PCR < PR∗
(ii) |P IL − PCR | > |PL ∗ −PR ∗ |
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(iii)E(U IL) > E(UL∗)
Proof : With no valence advantage the indifferent voter mβ is simply the
midpoint between PL and PR so mβ =
PL+PR
2
. The CDF of the triangu-
lar distribution gives L’s probability of victory as F (mβ) = 0.75 + 0.5mβ −
0.25mβ
2. Substituting in the expression for mβ into the CDF gives F (mβ) =
− (PL+PR+2)(PL+PR−6)
16
. L chooses PL to maximize EUL = F (mβ)[−(PL+1)2]+
(1−F (mβ))[−(PR+1)2] = (PL+1)2(PL+PR+2)(PL+PR−6)16 − (PR+1)
2(PL+PR−2)2
16
. Tak-
ing the first order condition gives ∂EUL
∂PL
= − (PL+PR+2)(−2P 2L−PLPR+7PL+P 2R−3PR+6)
8
.
Solving this for PL gives L’s reaction function asRL(PR) =
7
4
−
√
9P 2R−38PR+97
4
−
PR
4
. In a similar fashion I get R’s reaction function to be RR(PL) =
PL+1
2
.
Solving the reaction functions simultaneously gives the equilibrium policies
from the open seat election as PL∗ = −0.68 and PR∗ = 0.16. For the incum-
bent challenger election, R’s reaction function is substituted into L’s utility
function and L maximizes utility by choosing P IL. This gives P
I
L = −1 and
PCR = 0 which proves (i) and (ii) above. Proof of (iii) is straightforward by
simply inputting the equilibrium outcomes into the candidate’s utility func-
tions and solving. In the open seat we get E(UL∗) = −0.60 but when L is
the incumbent we get E(U IL) = −0.56.
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Chapter 3
Quality Based Political Selection in the U.S. Senate
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Abstract
I examine the extent to which electoral selection based on candidate quality
alone can account for the pattern of reelection rates in the U.S. Senate.
In the absence of officeholder benefits, I simulate electoral selection using
observed dropout rates from 1946 to 2010. This provides a benchmark for
the reelection rate that would be generated by incumbent quality advantage
alone. The simulation delivers a reelection rate which is almost identical to
the observed rate prior to 1980, at around 78 percent. In the later sub-sample,
quality-based selection generates a reelection rate which is seven percentage
points lower than observed. The divergence in the reelection rates in the later
sub-sample is consistent with the findings of vote-margin studies that indicate
rising incumbency advantage due to officeholder benefits. In addition I find
that the quality-based selection first-term reelection rate is significantly lower
than the observed first-term reelection rate. This result supports sophomore
surge vote-margin studies of officeholder benefits.
3.1 Introduction
Incumbents in the U.S. Congress are typically reelected.1 In an environment
with significant officeholder benefits, incumbents who would otherwise be
defeated may be able to retain their seats. High reelection rates are therefore
often taken as prima facie evidence of a poorly functioning political system
where lesser quality incumbents are not replaced. However the literature on
congressional races does not provide a yardstick to gauge what constitutes an
overly high reelection rate. Even in the absence of officeholder benefits, it is
likely that an incumbent would be reelected since he must be of a relatively
high quality given his previous electoral success. Incumbents who have served
many terms have defeated multiple opponents and so are likely to be of
very high quality. Hence their reelection rates are likely to be very high.
In this paper I examine the extent to which electoral selection based on
candidate quality alone can account for the pattern of reelection rates in the
U.S. Senate. The counterfactual setup may provide a simple benchmark for
the reelection rate in the absence of officeholder benefits.
As in Dix and Santore (2002) I consider candidate “quality” to be the
immutable characteristics of a candidate that are desired by voters. In the
terminology of Adams et al. (2011), this definition of quality captures “char-
acter valence” based on traits such as integrity, competence and diligence.2
Disentangling quality-based selection effects from direct officeholder ben-
efits such as superior media exposure, franking privileges, fundraising ad-
1Matland and Studlar (2004) find that the US has the highest re-election rate among
the 25 countries covered in the study: 82 percent from 1980 to 1994.
2Stone et al. (2004) also suggest that these personal traits are likely to reflect the
voter’s concept of quality.
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vantages and indirect officeholder benefits such as entry deterrence of high-
quality challengers, can be difficult as the full extent of candidate quality is
typically unobservable. A strand of the literature attacks this problem di-
rectly; for example Stone and Simas (2010) and Stone et al. (2010) use expert
informants to score incumbents and challengers in the U.S. House electoral
contests. McCurley and Mondak (1995) compiles indicators of competence
and integrity. However one can never be certain that all aspects of candidate
quality are addressed and failing to fully control for quality may lead to bi-
ased estimates of officeholder benefits (Gelman and King, 1990). To bypass
the problem, Levitt and Wolfram (1997) exploits information contained in
contests of repeat challengers; Lee (2008), Uppal (2009 and 2010) and Red-
mond and Regan (2013) employ regression discontinuity design making use
of the electoral history of bare-winners and bare-losers who generate similar
electoral support.3
I take a simple but complementary approach. I examine a counterfac-
tual framework where candidate quality is the sole determinant of electoral
success. I assume that candidate quality is perfectly observable by the voter
and the median voter strictly prefers the higher quality candidate. I simulate
an electoral process where the higher quality candidate wins irrespective of
incumbency status. The simulation is calibrated using the observed dropout
rates in the U.S. Senate over the period from 1946 to 2010. Reelection rates
from the simulation are then compared to the observed reelection rates in
3Empirical challenges remain. Using only repeat challengers leads to small sample size,
especially in Senate data. In relation to regression discontinuity design studies, Caughey
and Sekhon (2011) suggest that despite the fact that bare winners and bare losers in U.S.
elections generate similar electoral support, they differ on pretreatment covariates too
drastically to be considered as assigned randomly to treatment and control groups.
88
the U.S. Senate across terms in office and across time periods. Prior to 1980
the reelection rate from the simulation is almost identical to the observed
rate, at 78 percent. From 1980 to 2010, however, the rates diverge; while the
observed reelection rate is 85 percent, the simulated rate based on candidate
quality is only 78 percent. The seven percentage point divergence in the later
part of the sample may be indicative of an increase in electoral stagnation in
excess of what quality-based selection would generate.
The methodology of this simulation analysis is quite different from that
employed by regression analysis vote-margin studies. Therefore the results
can provide an indirect robustness check. The divergence in the observed and
simulated reelection rates from 1980 to 2010 is consistent with the findings
of vote-margin studies that indicate rising incumbency advantage. Moreover
I find that the divergence in the reelection rates is greatest for first-term
senators. This result supports the findings of sophomore surge vote-margin
studies.
Section 3.2 provides a brief discussion of closely related literature. Section
3.3 presents the setup of the simulation. Section 3.4 describes the data.
Section 3.5 summarizes the results. Section 3.6 conducts a sensitivity analysis
and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
While the literature on congressional races typically focuses on vote shares
rather than reelection rates, Jacobson (1987) argues that what matters most
is winning or losing, not the size of the victory. However, reelection contains
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less information than vote margin since the former is dichotomous while the
latter is continuous. Therefore Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) suggests that
studying the margin enjoyed by the candidate due to incumbency status is the
first step to understanding reelection rates. Depending on the methodology
used, since the 1980s incumbency advantage is estimated to be around four
percent vote share for low-level state offices and around eight percent vote
share for high-level federal and statewide offices (see Hirano and Snyder,
2009). While vote margins are clearly closely related to reelection rates,
the relationship is not necessarily one to one. Jacobson (1987) shows that
from the 1950s to the 1980s vote shares of House incumbents increased, but
there was no rise in the reelection rates. Likewise, Garand (1991) and Jewel
and Breaux (1988) demonstrate that the vote margins of incumbents grew
substantially in state legislative races in the 1970s and 1980s, but reelection
rates barely increased. Hence I analyze reelection rates directly.
Carey et al. (2000), Stone et al. (2004 and 2010), Diermeier et al. (2005)
and Gowrisankaran et al. (2008) have results on the factors that influence
the reelection rate. I address a different question by examining how much
of the observed reelection rate can be accounted for by incumbent quality
alone.
The closest work is Zaller (1998) on House elections. Methodologically
the papers are very similar. However Zaller (1998) investigates the relative
importance of forces external to the candidates − the role of non-skill factors.
Hence Zaller (1998) introduces a number of features other than candidate
quality into the framework which are designed to increase its realism. Here,
on the other hand, I am interested in establishing a benchmark reelection rate
90
in the absence of officeholder benefits that would result if candidate quality
were all that mattered. So a key aspect where the analyses differ is in our
treatment of indirect officeholder benefits. In Zaller (1998) the existence of
an incumbent reduces the competitiveness of the opposition primary and
hence the resulting reelection rate incorporates an implicit scare off effect
− on average the opposition fields a weaker candidate when faced with an
incumbent. Here I analyze electoral stagnation generated by selection based
solely on quality, absent any source of officeholder benefits including scare-off
effects which may lead to significant incumbency advantage. Hence I assume
that the competitiveness of the opposition party’s primary is unaltered by
the existence or non-existence of an incumbent.
3.3 Simulation Setup
I start with an open seat contest where two candidates run for office. The
qualities of both candidates are drawn independently from the same con-
tinuous distribution function F(q). Each candidate’s quality score (qi) is
permanent over the life time of his political career. The electoral outcome is
deterministic given the quality scores of the candidates; the candidate with
the higher quality wins the election and becomes a first-term senator.4 Since
the c.d.f. is continuous, ties occur with zero probability. At the end of his
first term the incumbent either drops out with an exogenous probability p1
4Note that this implies that in this framework voters are not forward looking. In
Gowrisankaran et al. (2008), even if voters only care about quality, sophisticated voters
may vote for a somewhat lower-quality challenger in case they expect the high-quality
incumbent not to run in the subsequent election. This is because voters may anticipate
future open-seat candidates to be of lower quality than the candidate who is currently
challenging the incumbent.
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or runs for reelection with probability (1-p1). If he drops out, then there
is a new open seat and the process repeats. If he runs for reelection, his
quality score remains unaltered and a new challenger contests the seat. The
challenger’s quality is randomly drawn from F(q) and the election goes to
whoever has higher quality. If the incumbent is defeated, I record a “defeat”
for a first term senator. If the incumbent wins I record a “reelection” for
a first-term senator. If the senator goes on to serve a second term, at the
end of the second term, he either drops out with exogenous probability p2 or
reruns with probability (1-p2). If the incumbent wins, I record a “reelection”
of a second term incumbent. If the incumbent loses, I record a “defeat” of a
second term incumbent; the challenger becomes a new first-term officeholder
and the process continues with the new incumbent. I follow this process for
500 million iterations resulting in precise estimates of the reelection rates
implied by the framework for each tenure of incumbent.
Any quality distribution function F(q) with continuous c.d.f. is permit-
ted.5 For instance, F(q) may be the result of a primary system. If each of
the k candidates in the primary has quality drawn from a distribution G(q),
then F(q) will be the distribution of the kth order statistic of k draws from
G(q). If the number of candidates in the primary is stochastic then the p.d.f.
implied by F(q) may be multi-peaked.6
5In the simulation I work with the quantile of qi. So rather than drawing an absolute
level of quality, I use the fact that F(q) is continuous to find each candidate’s position in the
c.d.f. with a draw from U(0,1). Because F(q) can be any general continuous distribution
I cannot back out the absolute level of quality. But candidates with a higher position in
the c.d.f. have strictly higher quality which is sufficient to determine the winner.
6By making specific assumptions about the distribution of quality, Zaller (1998) is able
to analyze the magnitude of the electoral selection effect when non-skill factors, termed
luck, have different degrees of importance in the electoral process. The cost of permitting
any distribution of quality is that we can no longer address this important issue. However,
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Note that the electoral selection in the simulation abstracts from scare-off
effects. In elections where the incumbent reruns, drawing challenger quality
from the same distribution as used for open seat contests implies that the
existence of an incumbent does not reduce the competitiveness of the op-
position party’s primary. Scare-off effects can arise from direct officeholder
benefits, where the electoral benefits of incumbency discourage high quality
challengers. Quality-based scare-off effects may also exist where potential
challengers are deterred from running against high-quality incumbents as
they view their reelection prospects as too low. Potential challengers may
also be reluctant to challenge high-quality incumbents if they intrinsically
value having a high-quality politician in office as in Stone et al. (2004) and
Adams et al. (2011).
The critical set of parameters of the simulation are the incumbents’
dropout rates p1, p2, . . . for each term. These may differ for different
terms in office. I employ the observed U.S. Senate dropout rates from 1946
to 2010. Since the problem is identical at each open seat, it has a recursive
structure. However, because there are an infinite number of possible states
(the term of the current incumbent and the number of elections since the
last open seat) I calculate the reelection rates via simulation.
realistic assumptions about the primary process can generate a quite complicated implied
distribution of quality and we know very little about the actual distribution of candidate
quality. So foregoing specific assumptions about F(q) allows for more robust results.
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3.4 Data
Each U.S. state is represented by two senators. Senators can serve unlimited
six-year terms. Elections are staggered with approximately one-third of the
Senate seats up for election every two years. Data for U.S. Senate elections
from 1946 to 2010 is garnered from the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of
Representatives.7 Biographical details for individual senators are obtained
from the Congressional Biographical Directory. For each election I have
information on the names of senators and challengers contesting the election,
the election outcome, whether the incumbent was reelected or defeated and
an indicator for open-seat elections.
In addition, the dataset contains information on how senators initially
entered office; by general election, appointment or special election. When an
incumbent senator dies or resigns before the end of his term in office, the
governor of the state makes an appointment to fill the vacancy until a spe-
cial election can be held.8 The appointed senator can then decide whether to
contest the special election or retire. In the counterfactual setup, elections
serve to weed out low-quality candidates and holding office does not in itself
provide any electoral benefits. Hence in my data, candidates who run after
being appointed to office are not coded as incumbents as they have not yet
gone through the crucible of an election. This is different from the usual
treatment in studies with incumbency advantage where they are treated as
incumbents since in those studies holding office provides an electoral advan-
7One advantage of Senate rather than House data is the lack of gerrymandering in the
Senate.
8This is with the exception of Alaska, Oregon and Wisconsin where the governor cannot
make interim appointments.
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tage.
The data contains a total of 1,154 elections. 268 of these were open-
seat elections.9 This leaves 886 elections that were contested by an elected
incumbent seeking reelection.10 The reelection rate in these 886 elections is
equal to 81.72 percent.
An incumbent senator can either be re-elected, defeated or he can simply
drop out. Table 1 gives the observed dropout rates of incumbents over the
period of study. The longest tenure of any incumbent in the data is 51.5
years of service in the Senate.
Incumbents may drop out due to outside opportunities in the private
or public sector, poor health and death. The simulated setup takes these
observed dropout rates as exogenous dropout probabilities. This is different
from Zaller (1998) where dropout rates are assumed to be zero until 34 years
in service (equivalent to just under 6 terms if applied to U.S. senators). Both
approaches have the potential to suffer from bias due to their treatment
of dropout rates. With no interim dropout, high-quality incumbents keep
rerunning which raises the simulated re-election rate. In the simulation,
incumbents may drop out before retirement. But note that the dropout
probabilities do not depend on quality. In reality an incumbent may drop
out to preempt defeat if she observes a higher quality challenger. Hence if
strategic retirement in anticipation of defeat were prevalent in the data, the
reelection rates from the simulation would be biased downwards.
9This figure includes 98 special elections, 61 of which were contested by appointed
senators who ran in the election following their appointment.
10Note that in my setup defeated candidates do not rerun in future contests. In actuality,
of the 886 elections contested by an incumbent, 54 involved repeat challengers. Of these,
19 previously defeated candidates were successful in their later attempt.
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Table 1: Observed Dropout Rates,
1946-2010 (in Percentiles)
Term 1 12.00
n=425
Term 2 20.26
n=306
Term 3 31.03
n=203
Term 4 35.19
n=108
Term 5 28.00
n=50
Term 6 48.15
n=27
Term 7 54.55
n=11
Term 8 25.00
n=4
Term 9 100.00
n=2
n is the number of senators elected to at least x terms
However studies cast doubt on the empirical importance of strategic re-
tirement in the analysis of reelection rates. From 1968 to 1978, Peters and
Welch (1980) find that House incumbents who were involved in a corruption
scandal were no more likely to drop out than those that were not. An-
solabehere and Snyder (2004) use term limits as an instrument to correct for
strategic retirement; traditional estimates of incumbency advantage that do
not take strategic retirement into account are only marginally different from
96
estimates that do.
3.5 Simulation Results
Simulations are run for 500 million iterations yielding negligible standard
errors for the simulated reelection rates. Hence differences from actual re-
election rates reflect either model misspecification or chance in the actual
election process rather than imprecision in the estimates.
Table 2 summarizes the observed and the simulated reelection rates for
each term of office during the period from 1946 to 2010, as well as the overall
observed and simulated reelection rates. The simulated reelection rates are
monotonically increasing in the number of terms. For an incumbent to reach
a high term in office, she must have defeated numerous challengers along
the way. Therefore on average candidates that reach higher terms have high
quality and as such have a higher probability of reelection, leading to electoral
stagnation.11 Note that incumbent-quality advantage is quite high even for
first-term senators which results in a 72.61 percent first-term reelection rate
in the simulation. First-term senators who enter office by contesting an open
seat are reelected two thirds of the time. But the first-term senators who
enter office by defeating an incumbent are on average of exceptionally high
quality. Hence their reelection rate is correspondingly higher, bringing up
the overall first-term reelection rate.
11After n elections since the last open seat, while the seat may have changed hands in
the interim elections, the quality of the current incumbent is the n+ 2nd order statistic of
n + 2 draws from F(q). Hence the expected quality of an incumbent is increasing in the
number of elections since the last open seat.
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Table 2: Observed and Simulated Reelection Rates
in the U.S. Senate (1946-2010)
Observed Rate (%) Simulated Rate (%) Difference (%)
80.21 72.61
Term 1 n=374 n=141.1m 7.60***
(2.06) (0.00)
83.61 79.30
Term 2 n=244 n=81.7m 4.31
(2.37) (0.00)
80.00 83.26
Term 3 n=140 n=44.7m -3.26
(3.38) (0.01)
80.00 85.89
Term 4 n=70 n=24.1m -5.89
(4.78) (0.01)
91.67 87.77
Term 5 n=36 n=14.9m 3.90
(4.61) (0.01)
85.71 89.19
Term 6 n=14 n=6.8m -3.48
(9.35) (0.01)
80.00 90.27
Term 7 n=5 n=2.8m -10.27
(17.89) (0.02)
100.00 91.21
Term 8 n=3 n=1.9m 8.79
(-) (0.02)
81.72 78.16
Overall n=886 n=318.1m 3.56**
(1.30) (0.00)
Notes:** signifcant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. n is the number of observations
(in millions for the simulation). Standard errors in parentheses.
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The simulated overall reelection rate (78.16 percent) is close to the observed
reelection rate in the data (81.72 percent). However the difference (3.56 percent-
age points) is statistically significant. The benchmark generates lower electoral
stagnation compared to the observed data. This is largely driven by the first term.
The simulated first-term reelection rate is 7.60 percentage points lower than the
observed.
Since the simulation abstracts from all incumbency advantages other than the
incumbent-quality effect, it might be tempting to attribute the difference between
the observed and simulated reelection rates to incumbency advantage arising from
direct and indirect officeholder benefits. However caution is called for in interpret-
ing the results. One of the dimensions in which the counterfactual setup probably
diverts from reality is the term-invariant quality of the incumbent.12 With expe-
rience senators may get sharper in early terms and then become more and more
detached from their constituents over time, cancelling the positive effect of further
experience.13 If in reality incumbent quality increases at a decreasing rate while
the simulation assumes term-invariant quality, the reelection rates from the simu-
lation would be too low in early terms. This pattern is consistent with the positive
differences in the first two terms in Table 2.14
12The assumption on term-invariant candidate quality is often employed in the literature,
see for example Gelman and King (1990), Levitt (1994) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997).
13Erikson and Palfrey (1998) provides evidence for increasing vote shares of incumbents
in the sophomore year, followed by a modest increase in their junior year. However senior-
ity is neutral on votes in higher terms. Erikson and Palfreys (1998) findings are consistent
with larger officeholder benefits which incumbents enjoy, especially in early terms, due
to increased name recognition. But they are also consistent with increasing incumbent
quality due to experience.
14McCurley and Mondak (1995), Stone et al. (2004 and 2010) and Stone and Simas
(2010) make use of expert informants and of the Almanac of American Politics to score
candidate quality. However measures of changes in incumbent quality across terms in
office have been more elusive. Hence it is difficult to differentiate between the term-variant
quality and the early officeholder benefit explanations for the rise in the vote margins in
early terms.
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Likewise, by assuming that the distribution of candidate quality is unaffected
by challenger/open seat status the simulation abstracts from the scare-off effect.
And by assuming that challengers’ quality distribution is unaffected by the quality
of the incumbent it abstracts from competent-government motivated candidates’
lesser desire to replace high-quality incumbents as discussed in Stone et al. (2004)
and Adams et al. (2011). Both these effects would lead to higher re-election
rates as they result in fewer high-quality challengers. Hence to the degree that
experience increases incumbent quality or that incumbents are able to scare off
high-quality challengers, attributing all of the difference between the observed and
simulated rates in the first two terms (7.60 and 4.31 percent) to direct and indirect
officeholder benefits may be exaggerating their magnitude.
However, there is also reason to believe that simple attribution of the differ-
ence between the simulated and observed reelection rates to officeholder benefits
may understate their magnitude. The simulated setup assumes no partisan swings.
Jacobson (1989) finds that the effect of national partisan tides on the probability
of reelection of congressional incumbents is negative and statistically significant.
With an average reelection rate of about 80 percent, incumbents have more to
lose with partisan tides then they have to gain. A partisan swing can increase
the average win probability of the incumbents it favours by at most 20 percent.
However it can reduce the average win probability of the incumbents who expe-
rience a negative swing by up to 80 percent. The fact that the counterfactual
setup assumes no partisan swings makes the reelection rates from the simulation
higher than otherwise. Hence incumbency advantage due to direct and indirect
officeholder benefits may be responsible for stagnation by more than the difference
between the observed and the simulated reelection rates in Table 2.
The literature exploiting vote margins indicates an increase in incumbency
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advantage over time. Levitt and Wolfram (1997) estimate that incumbency ad-
vantage in the 1980’s was more than double that of the 1950’s. Hirano and Snyder
(2009), Gelman and Huang (2008) and Gelman and King (1990) also document an
increase in incumbency advantage in the latter decades of the twentieth century.
As such I split the data into two subsamples, 1946 to 1978 and 1980 to 2010 and
examine the reelection rates across time periods. The counterfactual setup is cali-
brated with the dropout rates from each sub-sample from Table 3. Table 4 reports
the results.
Table 3: Observed Dropout Rates from the U.S. Senate
in Two Sub-Samples (in Percentiles)
1946-1978 1980-2010
Term 1 13.68 9.95
Term 2 19.88 20.69
Term 3 26.47 35.64
Term 4 40.74 29.63
Term 5 28.57 27.59
Term 6 70.00 35.29
Term 7 100.00 44.44
Term 8 - 25.00
Term 9 - 100.00
In the sub-sample from 1946 to 1978 the observed reelection rate in the U.S.
Senate and the reelection rate generated from the electoral selection simulation are
almost identical at around 78 percent. However the rates diverge in the 1980-2010
sub-sample. While the observed reelection rate is about 85 percent, the simulated
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rate based on electoral selection is only about 78 percent. The nearly seven per-
centage point difference in the later part of the sample may be indicative of an
increase in electoral stagnation for reasons other than incumbent-quality advan-
tage. This finding on reelection rates is consistent with the wealth of empirical
work based on vote margins which document an increase in incumbency advantage.
Growth in the size of government and the rise of TV are among factors cited in the
literature that may be driving forces behind an increase in incumbency advantage
in the U.S. congress.15
Table 4: Observed and Simulated Reelection Rates
in Two Sub-Samples
Observed Rate Simulated Rate Difference
% % %
78.29 77.75
1946-1978 n=456 n=312.2m 0.54
(1.93) (0.00)
85.35 78.40
1980-2010 n=430 n=322.8m 6.95***
(1.71) (0.00)
Notes:** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. n is the number of observations
(in millions for the simulation). Standard errors in parentheses.
However, it is also possible that the higher observed reelection rate in the later
sub-sample is due to factors other than an increase in direct and indirect office-
holder benefits. For example, growth in partisan polarization has been identified as
15The number of TV channels have been increasing rapidly since 1952 and Garrett
and Rhine (2006) shows that government has been increasing in size since the early 20th
century. Fiorina (1989) argues that the larger the government the greater are direct
officeholder benefits such as administrative office resources and improved ability to raise
campaign funds from interest groups. Prior (2006) claims that television gives incumbents
free coverage throughout their term and improves name recognition. Increase in direct
officeholder benefits can lead to challenger scare off, indirectly increasing incumbency
advantage. Levitt and Wolfram (1997) shows that reduction in the relative quality of
challengers since the 1960s appears to be a major contributor to the rise in incumbency
advantage.
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a trend in US politics since the 1980s. Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz (2013) claims
that in the last two decades parties have increasingly positioned themselves with
clear ideological divides on selected issues such as the social safety net, environ-
mental protection and immigration. This allowed the electorate to sort themselves
politically in a more consistent fashion which led to geographical polarization since
people live in more or less like-minded communities. As such Democratic states
may have become more Democratic and Republican states may have become more
Republican.16 Hence incumbents from red and blue states may not face as se-
rious competition from the opposing party as they would in swing states. So
incumbents’ electoral prospects are favourable in the more polarized states. The
simulated electoral selection model based on candidate quality precludes any ef-
fect of party affiliation. If one party had an electoral advantage, candidates from
that party would be more likely to be elected in the first place and would have
an easier time fighting off challengers. Hence the simulated reelection rate would
be higher than in the baseline model. This suggests that polarization and sorting
may be contributing to the seven percentage point reelection rate gap between the
simulated and observed reelection rates in the subsample since the 1980s.
3.6 Sensitivity of Reelection Rates to Dropout
Rates
Below I carry out sensitivity analysis to explore the robustness of the results to
changes in the dropout rates. Two approaches are taken. First, I examine changes
16A variety of causes of political polarization have been identified including pressures
related to campaign fundraising and more polarized pundit coverage on TV in the last
three decades. See Kaiser (2010) for fundraising and Hollander (2008) and Hetherington
(2009) for TV coverage.
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around the observed dropout rates to see whether reelection rates are likely to
vary significantly due to changes in the actual dropout rates. Then I examine
more dramatic changes in dropout rates to see the range of reelection rates that
can be supported by the framework.
First consider modest changes to the dropout rates from the baseline calibrated
scenario. The first row in Table 5A reports the dropout rate sensitivity of the
simulated reelection rate for the period 1946-2010. The exercise involves increasing
the dropout rates by ten percent over and above the observed rates for each of
the terms. So I multiply the observed dropout rates in Table 1 by 1.1. This
yields dropout rates 13.2, 22.28, 34.13, 38.70, 30.80, 52.96, 60.00, 27.50 and 100
percent for term 1, 2, etc. Naturally the simulated reelection rate based on higher
dropout rates is lower than the reelection rate employing the observed dropout
rates. Higher dropout rates imply that some of the high quality senators retire
at an early term even though they could have won in subsequent elections; the
reelection rate goes from 78.16 to 77.55 percent. Table 5A also reports the dropout
rate sensitivity of the simulated reelection rate for the two sub periods, employing
the relevant dropout rates. An increase in the rates by 10 percent for each term
(over and above the observed dropout rates reported in Table 3) leads to a decline
in the simulated reelection rates from 78.4 to 77.77 percent for the early sub sample
from 1946 to 1980, and from 77.75 to 77.22 percent for the later sub sample from
1980 to 2010. In each case the change in the simulated reelection rate is quite
small. This suggests that moderate evolution of senatorial dropout rates over time
is unlikely to have significant effects on simulated reelection rates.
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Table 5A: Dropout Rate Sensitivity Analysis
Time period Simulated reelection rates Simulated reelection rates
based on observed dropout based on dropout rates 10%
rates (baseline simulation) higher than observed
1946-2010 78.16 77.55
1946-1978 78.40 77.77
1980-2010 77.75 77.22
For the time period 1946-2010, the sensitivity analysis dropout rates employed are
1.1 times the observed dropout rates in Table 1. For the time periods 1946-1978
and 1980-2010 the sensitivity analysis dropout rates are 1.1 times the observed
dropout rates from the relevant line of Table 3.
Even though small changes in the dropout rates around the rates observed in
the Senate have very modest effects on the simulated reelection rates, dropout
rates are central to the analysis. In order to explore the range of reelection rates
that can be generated by electoral selection, I consider more substantial changes to
dropout rates. These results are tabulated in Table 5B. Scenario 1 is the baseline
simulation from the calibrated model from Section V. Scenario 2 assumes that
incumbents never drop out (which would require that they lived forever). In that
case an incumbent is replaced only if he is defeated by a higher quality challenger.
The quality score of the incumbent senator at any round of the simulation is
weakly higher than the score of all previous incumbents. Hence the simulated
reelection rate converges to 100 percent as the number of rounds goes to infinity. In
Scenario 3, I maintain the nine-term limit on senatorial careers but remove interim
dropout for terms one to eight, senators of high quality who make it to later terms
would always run for reelection. In this scenario, the simulated overall reelection
rate increases from the baseline 78.16 percent to 86.58 percent. In Scenario 4
senators serve a maximum of two terms in office (the shortest span that allows
for a reelection attempt) and first-term senators never drop out. In that case the
simulated reelection rate is 69.61 percent which is just slightly above the reelection
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rate of 66 percent that incumbents who came to office by contesting an open seat
have in their first reelection attempt. Challengers who defeat an incumbent are on
average of very high quality and hence are typically subsequently reelected. But
since in this specification they do not hang around for multiple reelection attempts,
they have only a modest effect on the overall reelection rate.
Table 5B: Dropout Rate Sensitivity Analysis
Scenario Simulated
Reelection
Rates (%)
1. Baseline calibrated scenario 78.16
2. No dropout (senators live forever) converges to 100
3. No dropout until term 9 and term limit of max 9 terms 86.58
4. No dropout until term 2 and term limit of max 2 terms 69.61
Table 5B suggests that the simulated reelection rates vary depending on the in-
stitutional setup. If this methodology were to be applied to different legislatures,
simulated rates would respond to their specifications. For instance in Missouri,
both the State House of Representatives and the State Senate have term limits,
four two-year terms and two four-year terms respectively. We would expect to see
a higher simulated reelection rate in the Missouri House than in the Senate, since
high quality incoming House incumbents are likely to be victorious in subsequent
elections. Therefore a higher observed reelection rate in the Missouri House com-
pared to the Missouri Senate does not indicate that the reelection rate is overly
high in the House.
In the time period from 1980 to 2010, the reelection rate in the U.S. House of
Representatives was 94% as opposed to 85% in the Senate. The intuition gained
from the simulation methodology suggests that there is no a priori reason to expect
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the reelection rates to be similar since the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate have
different characteristics; one term in the U.S. House of Representatives lasts only
two years as opposed to six years in the U.S. Senate. As such, members of the
House Representatives can serve a greater number of terms and the increased
frequency of elections may lower dropout rates at each term of office. Both of
these factors would serve to increase the simulated reelection rate for the House.
In addition, the minimum age requirement for the Senate is 30 while the age
requirement for the House of Representatives is 25. This may also lead to higher
simulated reelection rates in the House, since a high-quality representative would
have a longer expected life span in office.17
3.7 Conclusion
This paper explores one explanation for the repeated electoral success of incum-
bents in the U.S. Congress - electoral selection based on quality. Incumbents would
not have been elected to office if they were not of relatively high quality, and hence
they are typically victorious in subsequent elections. I find that electoral selection
based on quality alone may be sufficient to explain the observed reelection rates
in the U.S. Senate in the early part of the sample from 1946 to 1978. However
electoral selection based on quality alone fails to account for the electoral stag-
nation with high rates of reelection in the later part of the sample from 1980 to
2010. Since the 1980s, observed electoral stagnation has been higher than what
17The main difficulty with applying the methodology to the U.S. House is related to
gerrymandering. As pointed out by Gowrisankaran et al. (2008), it is unclear how to
treat elections involving two incumbents running against each other following redistricting
in the U.S. House. Mann and Wolfinger (1980) argues that the Senate also differs from
the House in terms of the media coverage received and the level of public interest. Hence
Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) points out that there is a higher likelihood of
the voter correctly identifying the higher quality candidate in Senate races.
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would be anticipated if the only driving force of incumbents’ electoral success was
candidate quality. I am unable to account for the high reelection rates of the last
thirty years using candidate quality alone.
Indeed if the sole reason for higher reelection rates in the later subsample were
due to an increase in incumbent-quality advantage, one would expect to observe
an improvement in the public’s opinion of the Congress. However this is not the
case. According to Gallup public opinion polls since 1977, people’s approval of
the Congress and of their individual representatives have fallen drastically.18 In
2013 Gallup polling, only 16 percent of the voting age population is reported to
“approve” of the U.S. Congress. This approval rate is the lowest in nearly four
decades. Furthermore to the question “[d]o you approve or disapprove of the way
the representative from your congressional district is handling his or her job?” 41
percent of the respondents replied “disapprove” in 2013. The rate of disapproval
recorded for the same question was 31 percent in 1992 and 18 percent in 1977.
One potential explanation for high reelection rates in spite of public disapproval
of incumbents may be related to rising incumbency advantage due to officeholder
benefits. Voters may find it optimal to vote for the incumbent who is likely to
occupy seats in important congressional committees as a senior politician and who
has the power to grant political favours, even though in principle they might not
approve of the politician for his or her integrity, competence and diligence.
If the gap between the actual reelection rate and the reelection rate generated
by candidate quality since 1980 is due to increased officeholder benefits, then the
implications of the simulation results are bleak for American politics. Overly
high reelection rates may have deleterious effects on social welfare. Even if the
challenger is of higher quality, he may have a smaller probability of victory than the
18See http://www.gallup.com/poll/165809/congressional-approval-sinks-record-
low.aspx
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incumbent. High quality candidates with high opportunity cost may be deterred
from running for office because of weak electoral prospects. This implies that
some sub-optimal (on quality) senators will remain in office. Furthermore safer
seats may induce officeholders to be less responsive to their constituents, since
they would have little reason to fear defeat.
While simple, the methodology of this paper is very different from the method-
ology of vote margin studies that estimate direct and indirect officeholder electoral
benefits. As such it may provide a robustness check on the results of these studies.
The fact that in the later sub-sample a seven percentage point gap opened up be-
tween the actual reelection rate and the reelection rate generated in the framework
driven solely by candidate quality is consistent with the established finding from
vote margin studies that incumbency advantage has increased in the last thirty
years. The difference between the observed and simulated reelection rates is driven
by observed high first-term reelection rates, which is consistent with estimates of
incumbency advantage based on the sophomore surge approach.
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